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This thesis examines the political, economic and cultural
position of the Circassian minority in Jordan. Although the
Circassian minority constitutes only about 1% of the population
it occupies a disproportionately influential political and
economic position. This thesis provides a brief historical
background of the Circassians prior to their migration to
Trans Jordan, outlines the means by which the Circassians reached
their high status in Jordanian society, the methods by which
they have maintained this position, and offers a projection
as to the future of the Circassians in Jordan.
The hypothesis of this study is that the Circassian
minority in Jordan occupy this high political, economic and
social position as a result of their loyalty to the Hashemi te
monarchy. This loyalty to an existing regime is a unique
cultural characteristic of the Circassians which has developed
as a result of their history. In the past it was chiefly
expressed in military terms but in the past thirty years
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I. INTRODUCTION
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the Circassian
minority in Jordan occupy a political, economic and social
status which is disproportunate to the relatively small
sector of the populace which they constitute. This study
will delineate and evaluate the current political, economic
and social position of the Circassian minority in The
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. To accomplish this purpose a
twofold methodology will he utilized. The bulk of this
study will examine the Circassians in a historical perspect-
ive, both prior to their arrival to Trans Jordan and after
their migration from the Caucasus. The conclusion of this
study will analyze the present political, economic and
social position of the Circassian minority utilizing a
behaviorial approach.
The present position of the Circassian minority within
Jordan is an outcome of an unusual and complex historical
process. The specific details as to the migration of the
Circassians to the Trans Jordan region and their settlement
therein in a topic largely ignored by most works which deal
with the area. This is mentioned by George H. Weightman
in his article "The Circassians":
" Of all the ethnic minorities in the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan none occupies a higher position
of social importance nor wields such tremendous
political and economic power than does a related
group of peoples known in English as the Circassians
and in Arabic as the Sharakisah. Nevertheless, most

studies on modern Jordan either entirely ignore the
Circassians or relegate them to a mere mention as a quaint
historic curiosity. There is nothing in the past of the
Circassians nor in their present role of a dominant
economic minority which warrants such supercilious
scholarly treatment.! "
The importance of an historical perspective in the
evaluation of the current political status of the Circassians
is in direct proportion to the continuing role which that
history plays in molding their present political attitudes
and expectations. While Jordan is, by almost any measure,
a modernizing country, tradition and history continue to
greatly influence its politics. Jordan has been spared the
violent revolutions which have occurred in neighboring Arab
countries and thus has preserved, to a greater extent than its
neighbors, a political and social continuity. As will be
shown later this political and social continuity has in the
past favored the Circassians and continues to do so to
the present time. It is for this reason that a historical
perspective on the migration of the Circassians to Trans-
jordan and their political, social, and economic history
in the area is crucial to an understanding of their present
position.
The second approach which will be utilized was originally
o
outlined in, The Civic Culture by Almond and Verba.
Weightman, G. H. , "The Circassians," Middle East Forum
,
December 196l, p. 26.
2
Almond, G. A. and Verba, S., The Civic Culture , Little
Brown and Co., 1963.

This approach is excellently analyzed in regards to its
specific application to Middle Eastern politics in the
article, "Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics"
3by Gabriel Ben-Dor. This article points out both the
strengths and weaknesses of the civic culture approach to
Middle Eastern politics and outlines the bulk of the works
which have attempted to use this approach, in one form or
another, to analyze the political system in a specific
country or social strata within a country. This article
asks several questions and develops several conclusions which
bear directly upon both the content and methodology of this
thesis.
First among the points raised in Ben-Dor's article
is the need for research which goes beyond the country
or elite centered studies to probe the attitudes of specific
groups within the population. As the article states, '
"More systematic differentiation between the various
elites is clearly necessary, but in order to make real
progress, it is necessary to go now beyond elite studies,
and research the political attitude or various other
groups in the population.^"
Dr. Ben-Dor is very quick to point out as his next
major point, the difficulty of conducting research along
these lines without direct access to the subject population base
3
-"Ben-Dor, G.
, "Political Cultural Approach to Middle
East Politics," International Journal of Middle East Studies
.
January 1977, p. 8.
Ibid.

He adds however that this difficulty is not one which is
likely to fade with the passing of time.
"One major obstacle to the shift from elite studies
to studies oriented toward the population as a whole is
of course the difficulty of conducting survey research
in the Middle East, both because of political factors
and cultural differences that seriously bring into
question the value of some survey research done in the
past in the region. This obstacle can be overcome in a
variety of ways. First of all, there is the possibility
of reviewing the available scarce data with a different
set of questions in mind. "5
This approach to the question of the political culture
of the Circassian community in Jordan is, under the present
circumstances, the only viable method. Data, historical
or political on the Circassian community is scar e and
on-site survey material virtually non-existent. This thesis
will attempt to compensate for that problem by combining
available data with numerous interviews conducted in this
country. While this method falls far short of the rigorous
survey requirements usually demanded by the "civic culture"
approach, it has disclosed several major facets or trends
within the Jordanian-Circassian community. Addressing this
point Dr. Ben-Dor writes,
"There is no need, however, to accept the 'fact of
life' that seems to be at the heart of the Almond-Verba
effort, namely that survey research must occupy an almost
exclusive place as the tool of analysis in the study of
political culture. Indeed, Middle Eastern specialists
could make a significant methodiligical contribution if
they were able to utilize the limitations of survey research
in order to develop alternative methods that are more





The third point which Dr. Ben-Dir makes in his article,
applicable to this thesis, is the necessity of exploring
the relationship between a group's political standing
and various other social factors inherent within the group.
As Dr. Ben-Dor states,
"Apart from the neglect of subcultural differentiation
and the lack of adequately dynamic orientation to continuity
and change, the relationship between politics and other
spheres of life was not sufficiently explored. A number of
scholars have observed that in the Middle East power leads
to wealth, and not vice versa. ' Does this mean that the
conception of the relationship between politics and
economics in the Middle East is a common, distinguishing
feature of the region? How does this compare with other
areas of the world? Does this mean that politics is more
or less salient there than elsewhere? What is the relation-
ship between this fact and the tradition of Islam as a
total, embracing social system? Does this cultural trait
help explain specific problems of political structure in
the region? "8
Each of these questions asked by Dr. Ben-Dor apply to
some extent to the topic of this thesis. The Circassians
were an Islamic group plunged into the Middle Eastern culture.
Admittedly the Circassians went from one relatively isolated
area to another, but the differences in the two areas cannot
be overstated. These differences will be explored in relating
the migration of the Circassian people from the Caucasus to
Trans Jordan.
7
r Here Dr. Ben-Dir cites, ''E.g., Manfred Halpern, The
Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North
Africa (Princeton, 1963) > p. ^6, and Elie Kedourie, The
Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Essays (Lo ndo n
,





The "civic culture" approach is difficult to apply even
under the best of survey and research circumstances. When
confronted with the lack of data available on the Circassians
the problem is compounded. However it is necessary that this
subject be explored beyond a simple historical recreation of
the facts available. The political, social, economic and
religious motives of the Circassians must be analyzed "to
lend a complete understanding of the place they occupy in
Jordan today. The "civic culture" approach lends the best
available framework for this analysis under the prevailing
circumstances
.
This thesis is organized into three major sections.
The first section deals with the history of the Circassians
prior to the formation of the Emirate of Trans Jordan in
1923. This section provides the necessary groundwork for
an understanding of the initial political, social and economic
position of the Circassians in the newly established Emirate.
The second section of this thesis deals with the
evolution of the position of the Circassians from the
founding of the Emirate to the present time. This section
comprises the bulk of the thesis and draws heavily from the
many and often contradictory works on this period. In





usually dependent upon the political leanings of the author.
This thesis will attempt to present these various views as
to the political and economic role of the Circassians
during this period and advance several independent theories.
Two major problems were encountered in the research of this
section. The first was the amount of misinformation which
is included in the scattered references on the Circassians.
As an example, Raphael Patai, in his hook The Kingdom of
Jordan states that the Chechen, a related minority of the
Circassians, are Shiite Muslims. Both personal interviews
and other sources assert that the Chechens are now, and
have been from their migration to Jordan, Sunni.
The second problem encountered was the understandable
reluctance of both the Circassian minority and Jordanian
government to stress or even acknowledge any degree of
separateness between the Arab and Circassian populace. Even
the estimates as to the population of Circassians in Jordan
is very much in question as past censuses included no
separate category for Circassians. Considering the atmosphere
o
This difference is nowhere more evident than in a
comparison of the works of Sir John Glubb and Nasur Aruri
,
( Jordan; A Study in Political Development , 1921-1965)
.
This comparison gives the reader the impression that he's
reading about two distinct minorities. Only the common title
Circassians links the two.
Patai, R. ed. , The Hashemi te Kingdom of Jordan . Human
Realtions Area Files Inc.




of Arab unity and solidarity which has swept through the
Middle East it would be only natural for a non-Arab minority
to resist efforts to single it out, even for the purpose of
a census.
The third section of this thesis will analyze the present
position of the Circassians utilizing the "civic culture"




II. THE ORIGIN OF THE CIRCASSIANS
The original homeland of the Circassians now living in
Jordan is the north-western portion of the Caucasus mountains.
A map showing this region with the major towns and cities
and tribal areas is found on the following page. The bulk
of archeological evidence points to almost continuous
inhabitation of this area since the Palaeolithnic Age.
The most probable ancestor of the modern Circassian race was
a group which resulted from the union of several major
tribes in the area and is known as the Sindo-Meotian tribal
union.
"The analysis of the archeological finds in Circassia
of the third through the first Milleniun B.C. testify
to the cultural unity of the Sindo-Meotian tribes (Kerkets,
Torets and so on), who inhabited here, and, who, it has
already been proven, have been the ancestors of the Cir-
cassians in general and the creators of the legendary Nart
Epos.
The Sindo-Meotian tribal union (as it was called by
Greek authors) which was formed out of such tribes as
Kerkets, Torets and others, began to experience, in the
first millenium B.C., a definite influence from the Scythian,
Greek and, later on, from the Sauromato -Allan ethnic groups
who came to the Caucasus. "12
The Caucasus area figured prominently in Greek mythology.
"Greek mythology claims that Jupiter gave the name to this
land to commemorate the day Saturn slew the shepherd,
13Caucasus, here." J
12Varoque , Khaireddin, "Archaeology in Circassia," The







"To the ancient Greeks, Caucasia, and the mighty range
which dominates it, were a region of mystery and romance.
It was here that they placed the scene of the sufferings
of Prometheus ( vide Aeschylus, Prometheus Vinctus ), and
there, in the land of Calchis, which corresponds to the
valley of Rion, that they sent the Argonauts to fetch the
golden fleece. "1**
For the purposes of this thesis only selected events
in Circassian history are pertinent, and a detailed re-
counting of the history would serve no purpose. Two major
points must be made concerning the characteristics of the
history of the region.
"Perhaps the most important characteristics of
Circassian history is the intertwining of the history of
two distinct groups. In the first group we have the great
powers concentrated sometimes in the Caucasian area, but
in the majority of cases having their headquarters far
away from the Caucasus. To this group belong the
Byzantine Empire, the Sassanian Empire, the Kazar Empire,
the Arab Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia. The
second group consists of the so-called small powers whose
main concentration has always been in the area. This
group includes the Georgians, the Armenians, the Circassians,
the Mountain Tribes, and the Azeri-Turks (a small power
only during the last centuries). The small powers in
general have lived under the domination of the great
powers, and with remarkable regularity, whenever the
dominating great powers become weak or were seriously
fighting with others they entered into their independent
periods, formed states with the attribute 'Great', or lived
in a ' Golden Age.
'
The second importance characteristic of Caucasian
history is that the South Caucasus and the North Caucasus
did not in general form a unit. In the case of the small
powers this is obvious. In the case of the great powers,
however, it must be explained by the fact that the mountain
chain of the Caucasus constituted a formidable dividing line.
It is very significant that the North and South Caucasus
have formed a single unit only three times. The first
case or rather attempt, was the Mongolian, in which both
areas were subjugated by the Mongolians coming from the East.
The second case was the Ottoman one, when the North and
South Caucasus were both occupied by them from the West.
1^Encyclopedia Britannica, p. 5^9
16

In other words, in both cases the expansion paralleled
the Caucasian chain, which circumstances somewhat
facilitated. Yet only once, in the Russian case, did a
great power succeed in dominating the whole area by a
direct crossing of the chain of the Caucasus. This
crossing was without doubt aided by a technology unknown
to the previous periods. "15
Both of these general characteristics of Caucasian
history apply strongly in the case of the Circassians. Of
all of the various tribes or tribal groups which inhabited
the Caucasus, the Circassians were, until their eventual
conquest by the Russians, the most independent from other
Caucasus groups and the most willing to enter into pacts
with larger empires without relinquishing their own inde-
pendence. Additionally the Circassians retained their
strongholds in the central mountain regions of the North
Caucasus and therefore were able to retain a greater
degree of autonomy than the peoples of the coastal plains
and steeps.
The first known empire to reign over the Northern
Caucasus was the Kimmerian empire which was probably
1 6
Thracian in origin and existed from approximately the
13th century B.C. until approximately 750 B.C. when it was
succeeded by the Scythian Empire. Shortly after the
establishment of the Scythian Empire, Greek settlements
began appearing along the Black Sea coast and it is through
the works of the Greek historian Herodotus that a great deal
is known about the Scythian Empire. These colonies became
^Halasi-Kun, T. "Historical Setting," The Caucasus
.






major trading centers and remained Greek in nature until
the end of World War II.
The Sarmatian Empire replaced the Scythian Empire at
17
approximately 250 B.C. and remained in power until 250 A.D. '
when it was replaced by the Alan Empire. It should be noted
at this point that the preceeding three "empires" simply
indicated the domination of one ethnic nomad people over
another. The only recorded empire in the class ically histori-
cal sense in the area during this period was the State of
Bosporus founded in ^38 B.C. by the Spartocides, a
1 P>
Hellenized Thracian dynasty. This small state centered
around the Sea of Azov, had little if any interplay with
the Circassians. This empire was conquered by Methridates
19
II, King of Pontus in 110 B.C. ' Bosporus is noteworthy
for the purposes of this thesis in that their records are
the first to mention the existence of mountain tribes to
the east which were, in all probability the forerunners
of the Circassians.
The end of the fourth century saw the Alans pushed
southward by the Huns. Following the death of Attila
(^53 A.D.) the Pontic Hun Empire was formed. This empire









founded what has become known as the greatest Turkic state
in history extended from the Kingan Mountains in Manchuria
to the Crimea. The center of this vast empire was the area
which is now known as Outer Mongolia. This empire appears
to be much like the former 3 empires in this area, a loose
confederation of tribes. The mountain tribes of the
Northern Caucasus in all probability concluded agreements
whereby they retained their independence in exchange for
a pledge of non-aggression or tribute.
The political situation in the North Caucasus remained
fairly stable until the early seventh century. At this
time the activities of the Byzantine emperor Heraclius I
(c. 575-6^1 A.D.) were to change the political complexion
of the whole Caucasus. In Heraclius' s campaigns against
the Sassanians he made use of the Kazara, a Turkic people
who had settled in the eastern Caucasus approximately
a century earlier. The Kazars participation in this
successful campaign gave them great power within their
region, and allowed them to establish an empire with
commercial -military outposts as far as Kiev and Norgorad
20in the west and northwest with their capital in Dagestan.
This empire became the bulwark against the Islamic expansion,
a bulwark which was to remain until the first half of the
11th century. It is most probable that it was during the
domination of the Kazar Empire over the Circassian mountain







the Circassians. This fact is attested to by most sources
22
and the presence of numerous Christian relics in the area.
This conversion was carried out via the Byzantine influence
in the area, the Kazar and Byzantine empires being closely
allied during this period.
A brief aside must be made here as to the introduction
of Circassians as slaves in the Mideast. The Caucasus were
frequently used as a source of slaves since the introduction
of ports on the Black Sea to the outside world by the Greeks
in the 8th century B.C. Among the slaves exported from the
Caucasus were Circassians who were prized for their hardiness,
loyalty and physical appearance. Later the slave trade from
23
the Caucasus was monopolized by the Genoese. J Circassian
slaves were imported in great numbers to Egypt to form the
military units.
The Circassians were imported to Egypt to form a bodyguard
for the Bahri Mamluk Qulawun (1279-90). They eventually
rose to power under the Sultan Barkuk, who was a Circassian
and is called the "Founder of Circassian rule" in Egypt.
The Circassians ruled from 1382 to 1517 until their power
was broken by the Ottomans. Even after their loss of
titular power the Circassians continued to represent a
21Encyclopedia of Islam , "Cherkes , " p. 22.
'TLongworth , J. A., A Year Among the Circassians , Henry




powerful force in Egyptian politics until they were
slaughtered by Muhammad Ali in 1811.
The rise and fall of the Circassian Mamluk rule has
importance to the subject of this thesis in two major
ways. First, it established for the Circassians a reputation
in the Mideast for military efficiency, if not often ruth-
less ability. Thus by the time the Circassians migrated
from the Caucasus to Jordan centuries later, the race was
both known and respected. Secondly, it raises an important
question, to be explored later, as to the relationship
between the Circassians in Egypt who survived the massacre
by Muhammad Ali in 1811 and the Circassian immigrants to
Jo rdan
.
To return to the situation in the northern Caucasus,
the Kazar Empire remained dominant in the Northern Caucasus
until the first half of the 11th century when the Empire
collapsed and in its' place three rival groups appeared.
The Oghuz Turks occupied the Don curve, the Alan tribal
group occupied the northern steppe region and the Russian
State of Kiev was founded on the Tainan Peninsula.
The Mongol invasion changed the political complexion
of the whole Caucasus region and brought about several






First, the Mongol invasion of the early 13th century
marked the first time that the entire Caucasus had come
under the domination of a single group. Thus it unified,
even for a brief period, the North and South Caucasus which
heretofore had usually been under radically different forms
of domination. While the Mongol domination did little to
impart a sense of unity to the peoples of the Caucasus, it
did make both sections aware of one another, and more im-
portantly, aware of the world on a larger scale. There is
little evidence however that there was ever any concerted
effort on the part of the peoples of the Caucasus to resist
the invasion and when the Mongol Empire split in 1256 A.D. , ^
it did so on characteristic north-south lines.
Upon the breakup of the Mongol Empire two distinct
empires came into existence, the Kipchak empire in the
north and the Ilkhanid Empire in the south. These two
empires were quite unfriendly and a no -mans land, the
territory of the Circassians and mountain tribes, existed
between them on an independent basis. Along the coast of
the Sea of Azov, Genoese colonies sprang up, dealing chiefly
27in shipping slaves to Egypt and Italy.
The political situation of the Caucasus was again








The whole of the south Caucasus fell to Timur and the
territory of the Circassians and mountain tribes was
used as a route for Timur' s several attacks against the
Kipchak Empire. Although Timur was never able to defeat
the Kipchak Empire, the stress of defending itself weak-
PR
ened the Kipchak Empire to the point that , in 1^05 A.D.,
it split into five different khanates. Of these only
two existed in the North Caucasus: the Khanate of Crimea
and the Khanate of Astrakhan. Both of these Khanates
were ethnically Kipchak Turk. The Circassian and mountain
tribes retained their independence.
The next three centuries, from 1^75 A.D. to 177^ A.D.
can be characterized as a period of Ottoman influence,
but not domination, in the North Caucasus and especially
in the Circassian territory. It is during this period
that Sunni Islam totally replaced Christianity as the
religion of the Circassians.
The year 1^75 A.D. saw two important events take
place in the Caucasus. The Genoese colony was completely
liquidated by the Crimean Khanate and this khanate signed
a treaty with the Ottoman Empire which reduced it to the
29
status of an Ottoman vassal state.
The relationship between the Crimean Khanate and the







group attempting to subvert or dominate the other. The
Circassians were not numerous or powerful enough to attempt
any domination of the Crimean Khanate, and were, in all
probability, too involved in inter-tribal conflicts.
The relationship of the Crimean Khans to the Circassians
is probably best described in the following:
" Replacing the Genoese on the Black Sea coasts the
Ottomans took Anaba (Anapa) and Koba (Copa) , but the
Circassian tribes in the hinterland continued to be
dependent on the Crimean Khans who as under the Golden
Horde sent their sons to be brought up among the Circassians
Along with the marriages of the Crimean princes with the
Circassian noblewomen this secured the attachment of the
Cerkes; they gave the Khans a yearly tribute consisting of
slaves as well as auxiliary forces'.'^
Between 1539 and 15^9 the Crimean Khan Sahib Giray made
a series of five expeditions against the Circassians in
an attempt to subdue them and bring them under complete
domination. However these expeditions proved to be largely
unsuccessful and after his death several Circassian tribes
31
sacked the Taman peninsula and threatened Azak. These
tribes claimed the protection of Ivan IV, whose second
32
wife as a Circassian princess.
Russia was a new and powerful force which entered
the political scene in the Caucasus with the occupation of
the Khanate of Kazan in 1552 and Khanate of Astrakhan in
155^ as well as their establishment of a naval base on
the Caspian Sea at Tersk. J This threat of Russian






, p. 21. zk

encroachment led the Ottoman state to increase its efforts to
solidify its influence in the Caucasus. This affected the
Circassian people in that, while the Ottomans acknowledged
the Crimean sovereignty over the Circassians, they none-
theless sent orders and granted titles to Circassian
tribal chieftains. The Ottoman sultan Selim II 'wrote to
the Czar in 1570 A.D. ordering him not to interfere with
315
his subjects, the Circassians. J
There are several opinions as to the major turning
point in the history of the Caucasus which marked the
beginning of the end of Ottoman influence in the area.
The most balanced view is offered in The Cambridge History
of Islam ;
Until about 936/1530 ^he Ottoman empire did not see
in the Grand Duchy of Muscovy a source of danger in the
north. Before that date the Crimea and the shores of the
Black Sea were threatened by the Jagellonian kings of
Poland and until the end of the ninth/fifteenth century,
by the khans of the Golden Horde. In order to oppose the
alliance of these two forces the Ottomans supported the
weak Crimean khanate and the Grand Duchy of Muscovy. In
consequence, there was a show of friendship for the
Russians in 897/1^92, and they were allowed to trade
freely in Ottoman dominions. When, however, a struggle
started between Muscovy and the Crimea over the remnants
of the Golden Horde, Astrakhan and Kazan, the Ottomans
saw for the first time that the Muscovites were a source
of danger to themselves. Sahib Giray who became khan of
Kazan in 929/1523 and of the Crimea in 938/1532 tried to
place Kazan under Ottoman protection and, with Ottoman
help, to hold the Volga basin against the Muscovites. In
9^5/l538» as a result of Suleyman's campaign in Moldavia,
the Ottomans detached southern Bessarabia from Moldavia
and formed the separate sanjak of Akkerman. This completed
the process of turning the Black Sea into an Ottoman lake.




However, on account of their preoccupations with central
Europe, and also because they thought that a strengthened
Crimean khanate might threaten the Ottoman position in the
Black Sea, they did not support Sahib Giray. Ivan IV (Ivan
the Terrible), after assuming the title of tsar in 15^7 >
proceeded to capture Kozan in 959/1552 and Astrakhan between
96l/l55^ and 963/1556 in spite of Crimean attempts to stop
him. He penetrated as far south as the River Terek in the
Caucasus, and found allies among the Circassians and the
Nogay. In 967/1559 Russian Cossacks raided Azov and the
coast of the Crimea for the first time. The prince (voyvoda)
of Moldavia, Petru Raresh, sought the protection of Moscow
against the Ottomans (950/1 5^3) • The pope began also to
consider the tsar as a possible participant in projected
crusades. It was at this time that strong complaints
against the Muscovites started coming in from central
Asia. In this way the future Russian threat was finally
delineated in the middle of the tenth/sixteenth century,
and came to the attention of the Ottomans. 3°
From this time onward the history of the Caucasus is
one of the struggle between the Russians and Ottomans, with
the Russians normally victorious.
Following the fall of Azov in 177^ A.D. 3 ' the Russian
occupation of the Crimean Khanate became inevitable. By
1783-^ the Ottomans had permanently lost the Crimean Khanate
and the Black Sea Cossacks held dominion over the eastern
shores of the Sea of Azov. In the eastern Caucasus the
39Russians had occupied Derbent, on the Caspian in 1722-^
^ Cambridge History of Islam , Cambridge Press, 1971
1
v. 1, p. 36, 33^-
-^Halasi-Kun, p. 299-
38Ibid.




and Baku in 1723. In the Central Caucasus the Russians
first crossed the Caucasus in 1770, establishing the
fortress stronghold of Vladikavkav (Ruler of the Caucasus)
and taking possession of Kutaisi. Thus by the end of the
18th century the Russians had penetrated the Caucasus in
the east, west and central areas. And in doing so they
had isolated the Circassians, as well as numerous other
mountain tribes, in pockets deep within the Caucasus
mountains
.
Following the Adrianople Peace Treaty in 1829 the
coastal strip between Abkhazia and the Taman Peninsula was
ceded to the Russians. This left the Circassians totally
encircled.
The history of the struggle of the Circassians against
the Russians is one which even today stirs powerful emotions
on the part of native Circassians. The conquest of the
Circassian lands by the Russians and the subsequent immigration
of at least half of the Circassian peoples from those lands
remains alive in the memory of most, if not all, present-day
Circassians. In interviews conducted concerning almost any
aspect of Circassian history of politics it is referred to








The Russian campaigns against the Circassians can be
divided into two distinct phases. The first phase, from
1837 to 18^5 ended in a qualified defeat for the Russians.
The second phase, from 1857 to 1864 ended in total Russian
domination of the Circassian lands.
The first stage of the Russian conquest of the Circassian
territories included the additional element of British
involvement. The agent of British policy in the area was
Lord Ponsonby, the English ambassador to the Porte.
On 20 January 183^ the Russian and Turkish governments
concluded a convention in St. Petersburg which provided
for the evacuation of the Romanian principalities by the
Russian troops which remained there from the war of 1828-9
«
It also reduced substantially the sum of the indemnity
which Turkey was still to pay to Russia. However the terms
of the convention alarmed Ponsonby in Constantionople
,
chiefly because it allowed Russian troops to be kept in
Silistria for another eight years and because it involved
a small frontier reclarification in the Caucasus which
brought Russia closer to Kars and to a caravan route
between Persia and the Black Sea coast. Meanwhile,
Palmerston had arranged with Ponsonby and with the British
commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean that the British
fleet could be summoned to the Sea of Marmora by the
Ambassador if he thought it necessary in order to defend
Turkey against an imminent Russian danger. This power was
actually used in May 183^-
During the next years Ponsonby succeeded in counter-
balancing Russian influence in Constantinople. The Sultan
was freed from sole dependence on Russia, and was able to
maneuver between Russia and Britain. It must be admitted,
however, that Ponsonby 's alarmist views of Russian aims
were far in excess of the facts, and that Nicholas I at
this time pursued a moderate policy. The same can hardly
be said of Ponsonby, or of his friend the free-lance
journalist and temporary diplomatic agent David Urquhart,
who conducted a rather successful campaign in Britain on
behalf of Turkey. His pamphlet "England, France, Russia
and Turkey," published in 183^, denounced Russian aims.
His weekly paper, Portfolio, which first appeared on 28
November 1835. argued the advantages of more extensive trade
with Turkey. Another favorite theme of Urquhart '
s
writings was the struggle of the Circassians against
Russia. In the summer of 183^ he secretly landed near
Anapa and met with a number of Circassian chiefs. He later
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published in Portfolio a Circassian declaration of
independence, which he had helped to draft. Early in
I836 he returned to Constaninople from London, and with
the approval of Ponsonby persuaded a British shipping
company, George Bell and Company, to send one of its
schooners, Vixen, to trade on the Circassian coast at
Sudjuk Kale. At this time the Russian government claimed
that the Circassian coast was its territory, but the British
government had not recognized the claim, while the Turkish
government also claimed that the Sultan had some authority
over the Circassians. Ponsonby and Urquhart reckoned that
if the Russians seized the Vixen this would cause a major
conflict between Britain and Russia, which they desired,
whereas if they took no action this could be used as an
argument to show that Russia did not control the Circassian
coast. Vixen was detained and confiscated by the Russians.
Palmerston, however, did not wish a conflict with Russia.
On 19 April he stated that, though Britain did not accept
that the whole coast was under Russian authority, she did
admit the right of the Russian government to make quaran-
tine and customs regulations in regard to the port of
Sudjuk Kale. It followed from this that the Russians had
the right to confiscate Vixen, and Palmerston made no
claim for compensation to the vessel's owners. ^"3
The "Vixen Affair" as it was termed made a large, if
somewhat brief, impression on the British reading public
and newspaper correspondents such as Urquhart and Longworth
continued to publish newspaper accounts and books on the
subject of the struggle of the Circassians against the
Russian invaders. These reporters were made more interesting
through the cooperation of Lord Ponsonby in Constantinople
who continued to support, if only by diplomatic means, the
Circassian nationalist aims.
During the first phase of the Russian campaign against
the Circassians, Lord Ponsonby sent, early in 1839 through
Z4.3
^Seton-Watson, p. 30^" •
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Mr. Urquhart, a letter which supported Circassian independence.
The communication was sent to Sefer Bey, the Circassian
ambassador in Constantinople. The incident is summarized
as follows,
"They (the Circassians) were to send a flag of truce
to the Russian general, demanding an immediate cessation
of hostilities, and proposing terms of peace for the
future. They were to engage on their part, to abstain
from all violation of the Russian territory, and to
respect from that time the international boundary of the
Kuban; while the Russians, on their side, were to retire
beyond the river, and evacuate the fortresses they had
raised in Circassia. For the observance of these con-
ditions, as regarded themselves, they were empowered to
offer the guarantee of England. These propositions
were to be made three times; and in the event of their
being rejected by the general, the result was to be forth-
with transmitted to the Ambassador at Constantinople."^
Their proposal was rejected by the Russian general in charge
of operations, General Willemeneff. ^
The Russians had decided upon a campaign of slow reduction
of the Circassian territory through the construction of a
series of forts which would steadly encroach on the Cir-
cassian lands and in time make the surrounding area of each
fort a passive district. To that end the Russians began the
construction of forts in 1837
•
Beginning in early 18^0 there was a large scale
uprising by the Circassians. The Circassians had united in
the wake of a Muslim religious movement known as Muridism.








in the Caucasus for centuries. The word murid means a
disciple in a mystical sect, in this case a sect in which
the disciples are initiated in the true Path (tarikat) to
wisdom by a holy man. What differed in the rise of Muridism
in this case was the leadership of a young murshid (head of
a sect) named Kazi Mull a. Mulla declared a holy war against
the Russians in Dagheston in 1827 and received widespread
support. In October 1832 General Velyaminore invaded Kazi
Mulla ' s territory and managed to largely pacify the area
and kill Mulla. Kazi Mulla was succeeded by Shamil, who
has been accorded by all historians of that area and period
as possessing a brilliant military ability, political know-
how and religious conviction. The problem of the official
government position on Shamil haunts the Soviet Union to this
... 47day with frequent revision as to his historical status.
Shamil was elected Imam in 1834 and immediately set
about to reorganize the administration of his movement.
He divided his territory which at that time consisted of
most of Daghestan and Chechnya, into provinces and dis-
tricts, each of which was administered by a naib who was
both military commander and civic ruler. The naib was
assisted by a kadi or judge who was responsible for the
administration of religious law. The positions were
mutually exclusive and each was forbidden to interfere with
the other. In the case of any dispute the matter was referred
47
'Henze, P. B. , "Unrewriting History-The Shamil Problem,"
Caucasian Review
, 1958, p. 7-29.
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to the Divan or State Council or to the Imam himself.
Shamil also instituted a system of secret inspections
to check the activities of the naibs and kadis. With his
administration functioning smoothly Shamil developed a
system to utilize the natural resources of the area for the
production or purchase of war material. He was successful
in this matter also and had built a powerful military
force by I836, at which time he began a carefully planned
and controlled campaign of raids against the Russians.
The military situation in the Caucasus was desperate
for Shamil and the Circassians in I836. The Russians
controlled the major cities of Stavropol, Georgievsk,
Vladikavkav, Ekaterenogradskaya and Tiflis and had
established a series of fortifications in the Caucasus
from east to west. Shamil instituted a series of raids
which were highly successful and threatened the Russian
positions. These attacks coincided with raids in the
western Caucasus which resulted in the capture of several
Russian forts. The next year, I837, the Tsar visited
the Caucasus and requested a meeting with Shamil, which
was refused.
In early I838 General von Grabbe headed a campaign
which laid seige to Shamil ' s stronghold at Ahalgo and
captured it, however Shamil escaped and Russian casualties
were 3»000. The Russians continued to attempt to pacify
the territory but at heavy cost. The Russians lost 8,000
casualties from 18^-0-1842 and Shamil ' s movement steadily
32

became more popular. As a result of the heavy Russian
casualties Prince Shernejskev, the Russian War Minister,
was sent to the Caucasus to investigate. He ordered all
military action against Shamil to cease until a successful
strategy could be devised.
In 1843 Shamil went on the offensive and again
threatened Russian positions throughout the Caucasus.
Count Michael Vorontsov was appointed Viceroy of the
Caucasus by Tsar Nicholas in 1844. Vorontsov advocated
a policy of slow and steady encroachment on Shamil' s terri-
tory, pacifying each area with a series of mutually supporting
forts with secure lines of communication between them. The
Tsar however pressured him for quick results and a disasterous
campaign was launched in May 1845. A force of 18,000 men
was sent into Chechnia to close with and destroy Shamil 's
forces. The mountain soldiers of Shamil retreated without
contact and when Vorontsov retired his forces they struck
at his rear. When Vorontsov eventually reached Grozny he
48had sustained losses of over 4,000 men. In 1846 Shamil
again went on the offensive and it appeared he would
militarily unite the eastern and western Circassian tribes
but this was prevented by General Frutag commanding the





Having failed in his attempt to link the eastern and
western Circassians, Shamil concentrated on broadening his
political, economic and military "base in the eastern
Caucasus. The Russians launched no new campaigns and
Shamil contented himself with sporadic raids upon Russian
positions. The period of 184-5 to 1857 was one of a
qualified and undeclared truce in the area.
Following the Crimean War, Russia was able to once
again go on the offensive against Shamil. In 1857 General
Yevdokimov launched a campaign (one report states he had
49280,000 troops at his command) which adopted the strategy
of slow and methodical encroachment and pacification of
Shamil ' s territory. Shamil ' s forces were steadily pressed
backwards and encircled. In April 1859 Shamil ' s stronghold
at Bedno was stormed and Shamil escaped with his most
faithful followers to the last stronghold on Mount Gunib.
Village after village had either been pacified by the
Russians or deserted Shamil ' s cause to seek Russian pro-
tection. On 25 August 1859 Mount Gunib was encircled
and Shamil ' s position became impossible. He surrendered
and was sent to St. Petersburg where he was received by the
Tsar. A personality who had been romantically treated in
Russian literature, Shamil was placed under light house
arrest and in Kaluga and later Kiev and allowed to make the
pilgrimage to Mecca, where he died in 1871
•
^Tatlok, T. , "The Centennial of the Capture of Shamil
A Shamil Biography," Caucasian Review , 1959 » p- 86.
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With Shamil defeated the unity of the Circassians
broke down, however various mountain tribes continued to
resist the Russians. The period 1859 to I863 is best
described in the following passage:
In 1859. after two decades of exhaustive war in the
mountains the Russians finally captured Sheyh Shamil, the
leader of the Circassian Muslims who were trying to main-
tain the independence of their lands. Subsequently the
Russians advanced southward along the coast of the Black
Sea to Anapa and Sakumkale, both of which were adminis-
trative centers and strongholds of Circassian Muslims.
Then the Russian army turned inland to face the Circassian
tribes which had fought against it under Sheyh Shamil.
The Russians demanded that the Circassians settle north,
in the marshes of Kuban, and serve in the Russian army,
or that they simply convert to Christianity. Caught at
this time in one of its periodic fits of nationalism
and Orthodox prosetylism of its numerous religious and
ethnic minorities, Russia regarded the Circassian tribes
as backward and took it upon itself to 'civilize' them by
conversion--forcefully, if necessary--to Orthodox
Christianity. The tribes rejected the Russian demands
and, consequently, were attacked and massacred. This
was a preplanned action intended to drive the Muslim
Circassian population southward, into the Ottoman territory.
In anticipation of this exodus, the Russians had negotiated
a treaty with the Ottomans in i860, whereby the latter
agreed to accept ^0,000-50,000 Circassian migrants. Short
of manpower, the Ottoman government hoped to employ the
migrants in road construction and cotton cultivation, and
to bolster its armed forces.
The Circassian migration from the north soon took the
form of a deluge, especially after I863, when the Russian
government began to settle the Cossack soliders in
Circassia. The tribes, anxious to escape the Russian
pressures, migrated south, to Anatolia, in ever increasing
numbers, by sea and by land. Although figures concerning
the exact number of immigrants (there were in addition,
other Muslims in the Caucasus who were forced to migrate
south) was 1.2 to 1.6 million. It is also estimated
that some 500,000-600,000 Circassians died of various
diseases or drowned in the Black Sea. In any case, about
1.1 million Circassians settled in the Ottoman state,
mostly in Anatolia, where they were joined, after I878, by
their brethern from the Balkans. A number of them also
settled in Syria and in Palestine, mostly in the Golan
region and in the Nablus area. "-50
^ Karpat, K. H. , "Ottoman Immigration Politics and
Settlement in Palestine," Settler Regimes in Africa and the
Arab World , 197^, p. 6^.
35

The campaign of the Russians to displace the Circassians
is recalled with the greatest possible bitterness, and all
accounts of Circassian history, written by Circassians,
include at least one and usually several accounts of the
event. The following passage is typical:
The fight for the Cacausus was at an end; the time
of suffering for the Circassians was, however, to last
much longer. Prince Voronzoff , the conquerer, tried to
act with political acumen and wished to grant a measure
of self-government to the peoples of the Caucasus. But
he came up against the bitter opposition of the Russian
bureaucracy and was obliged to give in. The already active
Panslavists were too strong for him. . .Alexander II, a kindly
and chivalrous man, tried to do some good, particularly to
the nobles, and formed a Circassian Bodyguard who remained
true and loyal to him. The former enemies became the most
trustworthy of vassals, for a nobleman does not break his
oath. The Tsar endeavored to reconcile us, in the same
way as he treated the Finns and Baits, but his governors
were—Russian governors, which means that very soon un-
believable tyranny reigned, under which my family suffered
amongst others. Throughout the villages, savage and drunken
Cossacks were set over the peasants , those hated men who
laid the land to waste, killed the men and drove the women
and girls to death through savage violation. The immigrant
Russian peasants and Cossacks let the land go to ruin;
they were no farmers. The last traces of the centuries
old Circassian culture were destroyed, a culture which had
aroused wonder and astonishment in Prince Voronzoff; the
starving, impoverished mountain peoples became bandits.
From the landed nobility most of their possessions were
taken by so called purchase, but few silver roubles
exchanged hands over a deal, and many families were brought
to ruin.-^1
The migration of the Circassians from the Caucasus to
various parts of the Ottoman Empire is a subject which
could easily comprise several theses.
5 Tuganov, M. B. , From Tsar to Cheka , S. Low Marston
and Co. Ltd., 1936, p. 13.
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One of the most severe problems the Circassians had
during their migration was disease, which was to plague
the migrants for years to come. Apparently the Circassians
had been protected from several of the more prevalent
scourges during their existence in the Caucasus. Typhus,
and malaria are prominently mentioned among the diseases
52
which took the largest toll.
One contingent of Circassians, perhaps as many as 15,000-
20,00CT were settled in Bulgaria in 1864 by the Ottoman
government. The Circassians were settled with a contingent
of 12,000 Crimean Tartars on land taken from the Bulgarian
peasants without compensation. Relations between the
immigrants and local populace were understandably hostile
and in 1875, when insurrection against the Ottoman govern-
ment broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovia, the passions of the
native inhabitants became inflamed. In May of 1876 in-
surrection broke out in the district of Phileppopolis , the
site of the Circassian and Tarter settlements. The Cir-
cassians were called to arms and a series of massacres
ensued. These events became widely publicized and for this,
as well as numerous other reasons , war broke out between
Russian and the Ottoman Empire. The war was an unqualified
victory for the Russians and was concluded on 3 March 1878-5^
52Papers Respecting the Settlement of Circassian Smmigrants
in Turkey
, Sessional Papers 1864, Harrison and Sons. 1864.
p. 579.
53^





by the Treaty of San Stefano which was found to be
unacceptable by the other great powers. The Treaty of
Berlin was subsequently drafted and signed on 13 July of the
same year. What both treaties had in common was a clause
which stipulated that all Ottoman colonists, specifically
the Tartars and Circassians, would be moved to areas within
the Ottoman Empire. By the end of 1878 the Circassians had




III. THE CIRCASSIANS IN JORDAN
There exists no historical data as to the exact date
that the Circassians settled in Jordan but the time can he
closely approximated. British writers frequently travelled
through the area, usually researching biblical/geographical
works. H. B. Tristram travelled through the area of Amman
in I876 and found only ruins. Another English traveller,
Laurence Oliphant found some settlers there in 1880. The
most descriptive account of the early Circassian settlement
in Amman is furnished by Claude R. Conder in his book Heth
and Moab * The passage describes his impressions of the
Circassian colony as he found it in 1881.
The Circassian colony at Amman is one of several
planted by the Sultan in Peaea. These unhappy people,
chased from their homes by the Russians, and again driven
from their new settlements scattered in the wilderness,
where land has been assigned them to cultivate. They
have, however, the listless and dispirited look of exiles
who find it impossible to take root in the uninviting
district to which they have been sent. Hated by the Arab
and Fellah, despoiled of money and possessions, and having
seen many of their bravest fall or die of starvation, they
seem to have no more courage left, and will probably die
-^Tristam, H. B.
, Bible Places and the Topography of the
Holy Land , London, 1878.
* Oliphant, L. , Land of Gilead , London, 1880, p. 72.
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^'Conder, C. R. , Heth and Moab; Explorations in Syria
in 1881 and 1882 , Richard Bently and Son, 1883.
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out by degrees, or become scattered among the indigenous
population. Our appearance at Amman at once aroused their
apprehensions. They believed us to be the pioneers of a
power which was about to seize the country, and anxiously
inquired whether they would be allowed to remain where they
were in case of an English or French occupation. It was
in vain that I protested that our work had no connection
with politics. The Emir begged hard to be made the confidant
of a secret which, he insisted, we knew, and I was at
length obliged, in order to get rid of him, to express the
opinion, that whether French or English took Syria, there
was no reason to suppose his settlement would be disturbed,
or that he would (as he seemed chiefly to gear) be given
up to the tender mercies of the Russians. -5°
The assumption that a large number of Circassians who
settled in Amman and the surrounding area were part of the
peoples settled and later displaced from the Balkans is
supported by several other works. Miss Goodrich Freer
states
,
"The Circassians of east Jordan land seem to have
first left their home in the Caucasus, Korimolsk or
Kakupschi, about the year i860, and to have wandered in
search of a home where they might be privileged to live
under Moslem rule. Their leader, the Emir Huh Bey, a
major in the Russian army, conducted them first to Asia
Minor, and finally, after many difficulties and disappoint-
ments, about 1878, to this district, which they call the
edge of the desert: "59
The foremost Jordanian-Circassian authority on early
Circassian history also traces the first Circassian settlers
from the Balkans
:
The Circassians who had gone to the Balkans as emigrees
subsequently left those regions owing to the Russian
penetration of the Ottoman lands in 1877 1 and resettled in
Anatolia. A small part of them came to Syria and Jordan
where the Ottoman State gave them agricultural land on
which to live. The Shapsoghs were the first tribe to leave
Turkey on a ship which caught fire while at sea. About
58 Ibid.
, p. 161.
-^ 7 Freer, G. , In a Syrian Saddle , London, 1905, p. 53
^0

seven hundred were burnt to death, and the survivors landed
in Acre, then moved to Nablus where they stayed for a year
before crossing the Jordan and settling in Amman. In 1880
groups of Kabardians and Bzadughs migrated to Jordan.
Others migrated at other times and founded seven villages
in Trans- Jordan, including Amman, which later became the
capital of Jordan. In 1905 a small number of Chechens and
some Daghestani families also migrated to Trans- Jordan. o0
The most detailed account of the Circassian settlement
in Amman is contained in Modern Amman by Miss Jane Hacker.
She states:
The first group of settlers to arrive in Amman was
about 50 families of the Shapsough tribe, who lost 700
members of their group at sea when their ship caught
fire. They came via Acre and Nablus and their journey
took over a year. A second group of 25 families arrived
in 1880, and in the same year another group coming via
Bulgaria settled in the neighboring village of Wadi es
Sir.
Some years later a third group of immigrants arrived,
some 77 families having made their way from Mersin in
Turkey. They were the survivors of a battle in the
Caucasus. They were called the "new settlers" as distinct
from the original group, who settled at the western end
of Wadi 'Amman, on the north bank of the stream and gave
the district its present name of Mohajarin (refugees).
Richard Sanger in his book Where the Jordan Flows
provides a concise and complete chronology of Circassian
settlement throughout Jordan.
It was under Abdul Hamid that the reconquest of
Trans Jordan from the Bedouin began. At his direction some
twelve thousand Circassian refugees from the Russian
Caucasus moved into the eastern highlands in the late
1870' s and took over the best water-holes. By this move
the Sublime Porte removed the problem of hordes of
Circassian refugees in Turkey, while at the same time
creating a bulwark against Bedouin in Trans Jordan.
The year 1880 saw two more waves of Circassian
immigrants reach Trans Jordan; a large party from the
Qabartay (Kabardey) tribe came to Amman, while another
from the Batharogh (Bzedough) settled about eight miles
60
Mufti, S. , Heros and Emperors in Circassian History
,
Librarie Du Liban, 1972, p. 273-

west of that city around the clear springs of Wadi Seir.
Two years later the colony in Amman was reinforced by a
second group of Qabartay (Kabardey) , who pitched their
tents a little west of the first arrivals in what is now
known as the Muhajireen Quarter. Muhajireen means
immigrants, and many people mistakenly think this refers
to refugees from the Palestine War, rather than to this
much earlier group of Circassian refugees from the per-
secutions of the Tsar.
In 1901 still more Circassians arrived from Turkey
and founded the village of Naour, where the new Point
IV road starts down into the Valley of Jordan. Then
about 1907. members of another tribe, the Chechens, also
immigrated to Trans Jordan, taking up land around the
springs at Zerka, later made famous by the Arab Legion,
and at Swaileh and Shuneh on the road between Amman and
the Jordan river. Finally, in 1909. a last group of
Qabartay moved into the area around the springs at Ruseifeh
ten miles east of Amman. All of these groups called them-
selves Hijrat, which is their word for immigrant. At
first the various Circassian tribes had difficulty talking
to one another, but gradually their dialects merged, and
now they all understand each other adequately and are
flourishing in their adopted land.°l
Fredric Peake in his work History and Tribes of Jordan
,
adds that an additional contingent of Circassians settled in
Jerash in 1885* " The omission of this information by Mr.
Sanger is understandable since Mr. Peake ' s book has been
criticized for his poor treatment of Circassian tribes.
This aspect will be discussed later. Most other authors
(Hacker, Patai, Toukan) state that Jerash was established
by Circassians but fail to give a date.
Additional information obtained from private correspondence
with Ahmad Mohager Shordom, a retired Jordanian Army
£i~\
Sanger, R. H. , Where the Jordan Flows , The Middle East
Institute, 1963, p. 264.
62
Peake, F. G. , History and Tribes of Jordan , University
of Miami Press, 1958, p. 222.
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officer, J strengthens the conclusion that the majority of
Circassian immigrants came to Jordan by way of Bulgaria.
Mr. Shordom stated, "The real primary route for Circassians
who settled in Jordan was from Circassia to Bulgaria to
6kTurkey, then to Jordan."
The chart below and map on the following page summarize











A detailed discussion of the Circassians in Jordan
requires a knowledge of the tribes and major divisions
among them. Thus far this thesis has dealt with the
Circassians as a whole, in part because the tribal and
family distinctions were not necessary in such a broad
•^Private Correspondence with B. G. (Ret.) A. M. Shordom,
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treatment of Circassian history, but also because the
sheer complexity of the subject made it impossible. The
subject of the tribal and family divisions among the Cir-
cassians settling in Jordan is still complex but had been
reduced to somewhat more manageable proportions. At the
outset it should be made clear that two groups, the Chechens
and the Tartars, who in many cases accompanied the Circassians
and settled with them are not considered Circassians. In the
case of languages, both the Chechen (called Shishan by the
Arabs) and the Tartar language are too dissimilar to be
understood by the Circassians.
The Encyclopedia of Islam divided the Circassian nation
into five major tribes, the Natukhay, Shapsug, Kabards
,
6 ^
Ubekh and Abaza. 3 Shauket Mufti, the foremost Jordanian
historian on the Circassians writes, "The Circassian people
originally constituted seven principal tribes: Zychs , Kerkets,
Sinds, Henochs, Achins , Zanychs and Basks. But these names
later changed and were replaced by the following names:
Kemirgey, Kabardey, Shapsugh, Nat-Khuaj, Abzach, Bzedough,
66
and Bask. " This information has been supplemented through
correspondence with Mr. Ahmad Shordom, a retired Jordanian
Circassian officer doing research on the subject who
provided the following charts.:
^Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 25.
6Mufti, p. 1.
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Mr. Shordom also indicates that the Adiga and Abaza are
the sole major Circassian tribes present in Jordan. The
Circassians in Jordan have, since their settlement, preferred
to be known only by the title Adiga. Thus it would seem that
the contingent of Circassians present in Jordan were primarily
from the Adiga and Abaza.
The most often quoted source on the Circassians is
Fredric Peake who provides the following information on






5 in Amman and 2 in Jerash
36 living principally in
lAfadi al-Sir and Naur but
also having 6 in Amman,
















65 in Amman, Suweima,












^2 in Amman, Wadi al-Sir
and Naur
10 in Wadi al-Sir
A comparison of these various tribal listings was made
in conjunction with a series of interviews conducted with
Mr. Bak, a Circassian official working at the Jordanian
69Embassy in Washington D.C. This compilation of all the
information available, supplemented with Mr. Bak's wealth
of knowledge on the subject yielded the following information:
Tribe Principal Locations
Abaza Amman and Jerash
Abazak Wadi Seir, Naur, Amman,
Jerash and Suweilih
Baisleney Amman

























69Interview with Mr. Bak, Jordanian Embassy, Washington























For purposes of clarity the Circassian tribal situation
in Jordan can be simplified even further without doing a
great deal of harm to detail. The majority of Circassians in
Jordan to date are either members of, or associated with one
of the three major tribes, the Kabardey, principally residing
in Amman, Jerash, Suweilih and recently in Zarqa, the Bze dough,
in Naur, Wadi Seir and also recently in Zarqa and the Shapsugh
in Wadi Seir, Amman and Naur. The reason for many of the
Circassians residing in Zarqa is the presence of the major
Army facilities there, a fact which will be explored later
in this thesis. The only exception to this is the Quisha
tribe whom , although quite small, have retained their
separation from the three major tribes.
The character of the Circassian settlements was quite
different from that of Arab agricultural settlements
further west in Palestine. The Circassians brought with them
numerous technological and cultural differences. Miss




"The Circassians made small gardens round their
houses and cultivated fruit trees and vegetables , lentels
and chickpeas for their own use. They kept cows and,
unlike the Arabs, used cow's milk. They had draught oxen,
a few chickens, sheep, goats and horses. They were neither
large-scale cultivators nor did they keep vast herds of
animals, like the Bedouin. In their own land they were
horsebreeders (as for example the Shapsough tribe, which
has given its name to one of the busiest streets in the
town), foresters and craftsmen, skilled in the use of
iron and wood. In their new colony they developed their
crafts and made and sold simple agricultural implements.
They also became traders. "70
Additional information about the early Circassian
settlements is added by Richard Sanger:
"They were the first persons to bring wheeled carts to
Trans Jordan since the days of the Crusades. Most of them
were made in Jerash, where the Circassian settlers had
access to the forests on the hills of Ahlun. They also
had plows and many fields in this part of Trans Jordan were
tilled and planted for the first time in many centuries.
The Circassians brought water buffaloes, which did poorly
except in a few of the river beds; but the oxen and cows
which they introduced, multiplied, although not as fast
as the locally acquired sheep and goats which needed
relatively little pasture.
The Circassians, especially those of the Qabartay
(Kabardey) tribe, have always been known as breeders of
fine horses and as expert horsemen. The relatively few
horses they brought were well cared for, crossed with
Arab studs, and have produced a sturdy strain. The
Circassians, however, never liked camels and did not
even use them for carrying loads. "71
The key factor in the location of the early Circassian
settlements was the proximity of those settlements to
water. This location produced an almost instantaneous
clash with the local Bedouin tribes
,
primarily the Adwan
70Hacker, J. M. , Modern Amman: A Social Study , Durham
College, 1959, p. 13-
71_ .Sanger, p. 265.
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and Beni Sakhr Tribes. Miss Hacker gives the following
information as to the attitude of the Circassian settlers:
''Considerable differences arose with their neighbors,
the Bedouin. Though Moslem, the Circassian way of life
had no affinity with that of the surrounding Adwan and
Beni Sakhr tribesmen, and the Circassians made no attempt
to adopt local ways. Like many other minorities, cultural
and religious, they tended to regard themselves as the
exponents of a superior culture and thus formed a close-
knit and endogamous community. In appearance, dress,
customs and language they differed from the Balga nomads.
Several went as volunteers in the Turkish army, and
the colonists were loyal to the Turkish regime at a time
when many of the Sultan's subjects were in a state of
rebellion. It is easily understood that such people
would not be received in a friendly fashion by the local
Arabs. "? 2
Prior to a discussion of the security measures which the
Circassian settlers were forced to take, it would be useful
to discuss, in broad terms, the cultural characteristics
which the Circassians brought to the area. This discussion
will give the reader a flavor of the life style of those
early settlers as well as an appreciation for the outlook
of the Circassians on themselves and their surroundings.
Again Miss Hacker brings us a picture of the Circassian
characteristics and culture in the early settlements:
Physically they (the Circassians) were taller and
larger-boned, grey-eyed and fairer in complexion than
the Arabs. In place of the Arab abaya and Keffiyeh, the
Circassian men wore a kalpak (the high astrakhan cap
which was later to become part of the uniform of the
Palestine police), a high necked blouse, a redingote
encircled by a cartridge belt and Russian boots. They
carried a long, straight dagger, decorated with fine
silverwork, a gun and a courbash. This costume is still
worn by the Royal Guard, a group of Circassians which,
since the time of the Amir Abdullah, has accompanied the
reigning monarch on state occasions. The women wore a




they did not cover the face, and they had a greater degree
of independence than was customary among Moslem women.
On festive occasions men and women danced together—a
shocking and impious sight to the Bedouin Moslem—to the
sound of a simple flute or home-made violin. Nowadays
the accordian is the favorite instrument. Their pentatonic
melodies were not unlike Scottish Highland airs and quite
different in character and rhythm from the Bedouin chants.
They amused themselves by swordplay, by displays of horse-
menship— in this they had a common interest with the Arabs-
jumping their horses over fire, leaping from one galloping
horse to another in the Cossack tradition. They wed within
the tribe (the price of a bride was a horse and 20 Turkish
gold pounds) and carried out their traditional marriage-
by-abduction rites. The well-being and good of the group
was the responsibility of their leader, called by the
Arabs a 'despotic Sheikh'. The Circassians spoke their
dialect at home, Turkish in official affairs, and rudimentary
Arabic in dealing with the Tribesmen. 73
When discussing Circassian culture during interviews the
same terms were invariably repeated. The most predominant
of these was discipline, which is instilled in Circassian
youth at an early age and reinforced throughout his life.
Mr. George Weightman comments on this in his article "The
Circassians"
:
In the true traditions of a warrior group, Circassians,
whether male or female, are not expected to show any
emotions at time of sickness or death. The individual is
expected to discipline his own emotions just as he is
expected to discipline himself to the orders of superiors.
This cultural expectation and, indeed, the whole spirit of
this proud people can be summarized by a traditional
story concerning Mirza Pasha.
One day while this war-like chieftain was visiting
some of his retainers, he entered the bedroom of a dying
Circassian who was surrounded by his weeping female
relatives. Hearing the moans and sobs of the dying man,
Mirza Pasha laughed. When the man angrily inquired how
he could laugh at such a time. Mirza. Pasha replied that
any Circassian warrior lucky enough to die in bed surrounded
by his women should have no reason for complaints or sadness.
Angered by Mirza Pasha's insensitivity to his pain and the






approved Circassian attitude) , the dying man cursed Mirza
Pasha saying, 'May your death, be as mine and may you
remember me at your time of death'. With the aristocratic
manner of disdain appropriate to a Circassian chief tan,
Mirza Pasha replied, 'May you live to see that I don't
die thus. ' Many years after the death of the man when the
Pasha was about to die himself, he apparently remembered
the vow of the dying man. However, the manner was not to
be the same. Rising from his bed, Mirza Pasha spent
many hours stoically in a hard chair until he quietly and
without any complaints or show of emotion died.'^
Another cultural characteristic which has surfaced during
interviews has been that of loyalty or respect for superiors.
While it may seem at the outset that these two characteristics
are at least dissimilar, in the Circassian concept they are
inter-related. Loyalty, once given, whether voluntarily to
an outside power, such as the Ottoman Empire or Hashemite
Kingdom, or by birth to a family is steadfast and unquestion-
ing. Thus in a sea of rebellion the Circassians remained
loyal to the Ottoman Empire until that empire ceased to
exist. Tied to this concept is a custom which Mr. Weightman
discusses
:
"Although the system of ceremonial abduction has
long attracted the attention of romantic outsiders, their
most interesting cultural practice from the sociological
point of view has often escaped the notice of observers
despite the continued strength of its sanctions. The
Circassians practice what for want of a better word may
be termed 'brother avoidance'. Anthropologists have
recorded that many societies practice 'in-law avoidance'
to minimize social conflicts and a few even practice
'brother-sister' avoidance to minimize the feared potential-
ities of incest. But this observer knows of no other
society which has gone so far to curb formally the universal
possibilities of sibling rivalry. Younger brothers do not
simply defer to their older brothers; they are expected
to minimize contact with them. Thus, if a man arrives at
a dance party, social gathering, club, or restaurant and




to withdraw discreetly. Brothers— especially younger
brothers—never introduce their friends, or business
associates to their older brothers. If such introductions
are deemed necessary or desirable, it is expected that the
introductions will be done by others. Along with brother
avoidance tends to go a pattern of social strain and
tension betv/een fathers and sons. Some Circassian adult
males have literally never had any direct conversation
with their fathers. Such a situation is considered a
commendable example of proper filial respect. "75
This custom of, as Mr. Weightman terms it, "brother
avoidance" has been confirmed by interviews which I have
conducted, however not to the degree which he pictures.
However, respect for elders, both within the family and
without, is a cultural characteristics which is heavily
emphasized.
The image which emerges of the Circassian culture should
be one of a warrior race, aggrarian in nature, with several
highly developed and emphasized cultural traits. A socio-
logical study of the subject would probably trace the
development of these characteristics and give several reasons
for each. For the purposes of this thesis, it is enough that
a basic understanding is developed of the outlines of the
way in which the Circassians view themselves and their
culture.
Frequent references have been made as to the enmity
which existed between the Circassians and the local Arab
tribes. Most sources attribute the establishment of the
Circassians by the Ottoman government in the early settlements





in Palestine and the desert tribes. The following passage
is typical:
"The Turks took measures to gain control of Trans Jordan
through and establishment of security by bringing into the
territory a number of Circassians. .. In 1870 the Turks
began to send them to Trans Jordan; they gave them land
grants and helped them establish villages and towns as
counterforces against the roaming bedouins. The Turks
hoped that the mutual antagonisms would serve their
purpose; they would be able to establish their authority
by sponsoring the settlement of the Circassians. "7o
Thus from the outset, security became a primary objective
for the Circassians. Again Jane Hacker provides an
excellent account of the situation:
"Before the colony could expand and prosper the
Circassians had to make their position secure and they
had to do so by their own efforts. Although they had
the moral support of the Sultan and the Administration,
material support in the form of soldiers or police was
entirely lacking. The nearest gendarmerie post was Es
Salt, twenty miles distant along a rough track, with no
postal or telegraphic communication. The Arabs resented
the intrusion of the newcomers into any part of what they
considered their grazing ground or grain lands, whether
these lands were left idle or not. "77
A more colorful account of the experiences of the
Circassian settlers in Syria, about 1880, which would also
have been fairly typical of the Trans Jordanian Circassians,
is given by the Circassian author Moussa Bey Tuganoff
:
These (the Syrian Circassians) had established a
regular settlement in their new country, near the
border where the Turkish government had allowed them to
settle. Land had been placed at their disposal and they
were protected by the government. Villages sprang up, the
Shwadran, B.
, Jordan: A State of Tension , Council for




land was cultivated, and the old customs of the homeland
continued, as did the dress and speech. Nor did the
settlers swords and kindjal rust for long, for the Turks
welcomed the advent of so many brave men and had not
presented them with land entirely for disinterested
reasons. Here on the frontier lived the wild, uncivilized
tribes of Druses and Beduin who had already caused the
authorities no little worry and cost them several punitive
expeditions. The banditry and feuds continued, however,
and rebellion was the order of the day.
These two tribes were accustomed to prey upon defenseless,
peaceable country people, and an encounter between their
hordes and the Circassians could only give rise to bloody
combat. Bit by bit the Circassians won their new home from
the raiders, and many a dead Beduin carried the kindjal in
his breast, while Circassian women wept over the terrible
wounds caused by the yaghatan, which penetrated the soft
cherkesska all too easily. The Circassians became the
leaders of the Turkish expeditions against the tribesmen,
and in this way their worth as fighters was discovered,
and many of them were called to positions of authority
in the Government and at court, where iftey became famous
for their loyalty and trustworthiness.™
The Peace Handbook published in 1920 gives by far the
best summation of the security situation of the early
Circassians
:
The colonists were to be pioneers in every sense; for
they had to introduce not only their ploughs where nomad
Arabs had been content to pasture, but also in the eighties
their own government and police; for neither the Jaulan
nor the Balqa (areas) would the Imperial government organize
permanently its administrations or garrisons till 1895 • The
land assigned where mostly government property according
to the letter of the Ottoman law, since, no doubt, they
had neither paid tax nor been till-ed within the prescribed
term, nor indeed at any time. But Ottoman law had not run
in Trans Jordan and the nomads and half -settled Arab villagers
held that the lands so disposed of were, in fact, theirs.
Accordingly local enmity to the colonists was assured from
the outset... The government consistently supported its
colonists, rounding up more than once on their behalf as
irreconcilable tribe or clan, as for example, the Abbad
Arabs near Es Salt or a section of the Beni Hasan near
Jerash, and sending it to cool its passions west of Jordan
or in the eastern desert; and the Cherkess have been able to
hold on... In Trans Jordan measures were taken to compel
settlement along arable fringes. These measures took the
78 mTuganoff, p. 43.
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form of free or favorable grants of land, opening of local
markets, establishment of administrative posts and police
caracols, and lately (1920) road construction. .. In the
Trans Jordanian country, where settlement had been slowly
spreading for a generation amid a welter of tribal claims
and feuds , the government undertook at last in the nineties
to assure and promote the process by establishing garrisoned
posts from Kuneitra southwards and by introducing adminis-
trative machinery of the same type as in Syria. A
Mutassarif appeared at Kerak for example in 1895 and 7 g
Kaimmakams and Mudirs followed throughout the Balqa region.
Miss Hacker recounts an interview with the eminent
Circassian historian Dr. Shaqat al Mufti, the brother of Said
al Mufti, of which a great deal will be written later in
this paper. Miss Hacker writes:
"The way in which the Circassians of Amman gained
their immunity from attack was recounted by Dr. Mufti.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there
was an endemic cold war between the settlers and the
Bedouin which broke out sporadically into shooting affrays.
The Bedouin of east Jordan kept the villagers of the
marginal lands, Circassian and Christian alike, in a con-
stant state of fear and suspense, as much by their boasts
and taunts as by their prowess in sudden raids. The
Circassians of Amman were not deterred by this psychological
warfare. They returned taunt for taunt and boast for boast.
Dr. Mufti tells how his grandfather replied to the threats
of the Beni Sakhr sheikh in the following words: 'I have
fought many men; and I have the scars of seven wounds on
my body; if you want to fight, then fight. But be sure
to bring enough camels to carry away your corpses. '"80
The friction between the Circassians and the Bedouins
finally erupted into open warfare in 1900 in an incident
known as the "Balqawiyeh War". A Circassian maiden from
Amman had been kidnapped by some Arabs from the Balqawi
797 Great Britain, Peace Handbooks , No. 60 Syria and




tribe. A pitched battle was fought between the Circassians,
as sis ted by the Bani Sakhr Beduin tribe and the Balqawi at
Quweismeh. The Circassians had concluded a mutual assistance
pact with the Bani Sakhr and the Bani Sakhr honored the
agreement and came to the Circassians assistance. The com-
bined Circassian/Bani Sakhr force won the battle, and a
period of relative peace and security began. It was this
security which encouraged the migration of merchants and
O -I
craftsmen from Syria and Palestine.
The local Arab tribes were not the only enemy the
Circassians found it necessary to fight. The Circassians
relied upon rain, rather than irrigation and a drought could
destroy their crops completely. The usual drought cycle in
this area is one year in seven. They grew a mixture of
wheat and barley which was particularly hardy and suitable
to the area. But even in years in which ample rain was
received other natural enemies took their toll. As Sanger
recounts
,
"During the last few years locusts have been fought by
the Jordanian forces and by international anti-locust
patrols. Up until World War I, however, such modern
organizations were unknown in Trans Jordan, and the Cir-
cassians had to resort to their own primitive methods of
fighting the black swarms of hungry insects. In addition
to beating drums and burning smoky fires, they regularly
dispatched missions to Turkey, who brought back 'locust
water'
. This liquid came from areas in Turkey which were
free of locusts and had been blessed by persons known to




with 'locust waters' were believed by the Circassians
to be locust repellent and farmers whose fathers spent
good money for this remarkable liquid still boast of
its potency. "°3
The arrival of the Hejaz railroad in 1905 brought both
prosperity and challenge to the Circassians. Trains ran
84from Damascus to Maan three times weekly and a railway
station established three kilometers east of Amman served
as a link to the outside world and brought both traders and
settlers to the area. But some of the Sedouin tribesmen saw
the railway as a threat to the revenues they had heretofor
collected from pilgrims using the route to Mecca. Additionally
the railway bypassed Es Salt, the largest Trans Jordanian
settlement located to the north-west of Amman. The Circassians
were called into service by the Turks and the Ottoman
officials lost no time in enlisting the services of the
Circassians which they had used with such efficiency in
Syria. 3y 1907 a two hundred man cavalry unit had been
formed at Kurach and units were dispatched to patrol the
line. This unit remained in being until World War I and
8 ^
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By the advent of World War I the Circassian settlements
had been established as secure and permanent settlements
,
with Amman as the hub. Miss Hacker gives this picture of
Amman in 191^:
"Although Amman remained a predominantly Circassian
community until World War I, with approximately 300
families in 191^ > its growing success as a trading center
attracted traders, both Moslem and Christian from else-
where. Some of the first non-Circassian arrivals were
Christian merchants from Es Salt. . .Syrian Moslems also
came from Damascus to open up shops in Amman, and no
doubt some of the fifty Christian families established
under the protection of the Church at Madaba during
1880 also sought the greater safety of Amman. 86
The establishment of such a large number of merchants and
traders from other areas is at least partically due to
the traditional dislike of the Circassians for trade. As
Dr. Weightman states, "The Circassian convential disdain
for mercantile pursuits is so strong that one can literally
count the number of families directly connected with trade
on the fingers of one hand—with two or three fingers to
„87
spare.
The political situation of the Circassians at this time
was fairly straightforward. The Ottoman administration
routinely preferred to deal with one representative of any
given minority under their supervision and the Circassians





mentioned, is today considered to be the last of the true
Circassian "chiefs" in that he both represented the
Circassians as a whole in dealings with the Ottoman govern-
ment and was responsible for the Circassian tribes in the
area to the administration. Although his leadership was
challenged prior to World War I he appeared to be fairly
secure in his position.
Mirza Pasha was not one of the original Circassian
settlers in Amman. He arrived approximately 1907 from
Lebanon where a portion of his tribe, the Shapsogh had
88been settled. Mirza Pasha had occupied an official
governmental position with the Ottoman Empire prior to his
arrival in Jordan and thus had already established official
ties with the administration. He was famous, in the model
of most Circassian leaders, for his integrity, valor and
religious fanaticism. Usually travelling with two horses,
since he could outlast one of them, he quickly established
himself as the leader of all of the tribes with the exception
of the Kabardey. The Kabardey were led by Muhammad el Mufti
89
who was one of the original settlers. 7 His son, Said el
Mufti emerges as a very powerful political figure in later
years.
These then were the major strains of the early Circassian
settlement from what sketchy details emerge from books and
88
Mr. Bak, 25 May 1978.
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interviews. A group of flourishing settlements, periodically
harassed "by the Bedouin, supporting the Turks both in spirit
and with arms. Miss Hacker pictures Amman as follows:
The Amman of the early twentieth century was a small,
self-contained, largely self-sufficient community. It
was a sizeable i village of a few thousand inhabitants-
middlemen, trading agricultural products for simple
manufactured articles, for cloth, tea, sugar, kerosene
and household utensils brought from Damascus and
Jerusalem. The money in circulation was the silver
mejidih, the equivalent of 20 piasters or five shillings,
and the gold lira, the Turkish pound equal to 5 mejideh.
Paper money was not thought of, and banks were unknown.
Savings were carried in the form of gold coin necklaces
or a decoration to a women's headdress. Houses and shops
lay in the valley hidden from the approaching traveler.
Rough earth roads converged on the village from Wadi Seir
and Naur, sister settlements to the west and south-west
respectively; from Madaba to the south; from Zerqa to the
north-east and the railway, and the desert on the east.
From Es Salt came tax collecters, soldiers and the weekly
postman with his two guards. Travelers journeyed on
horse or camel back; goods were carried by ox cart; by
four wheeled, horse drawn wagons or by camel train. One
Turkish administrative officer alone was responsible for
all administrative affairs. "90
World War I in Trans Jordan did very little to change the
basic fabric of society although it did change the physical
surroundings. The Circassian settlements, most especially
Amman, remained loyal to the Ottoman government and provided
recruits and intelligence. Unfortunately the forests which
surrounded the Circassian settlements, to include those
which were part of orchards and private gardens, were cut
down to provide fuel for the trains on the Hejaz railways.
Amman served as a distributing point for Ottoman supplies and
several thousand Turkish and German troops were stationed




in the war, important only in that it served as a link to
other areas, chiefly Damascus to the north. Building and
construction increased greatly and the Circassian communities
enjoyed something of a war-time boom. Several attacks were
made by the British to capture Amman but there were primarily
secondary efforts and were repulsed.
The major problem in analyzing the Circassian role in
the war is that few if any accounts specify the nationality
of troops engaged in the skirmishes which occured in the
area and little historical information could be drawn even
in the event that they did. The Ottoman forces at this
time were a mixture of minorities and Turks, and even if
accounts did state that an action had been taken against
Circassians, which none do, the question as to the origin of
these Circassians would still be unanswered. Circassians were
settled in several locations in Turkey, with a large settle-
ment in Syria. Thus the only action involving Circassians
which we can be sure involved those of the local variety was
after the Turkish and German troops departed. On 2^
91September 1918 the German and Turkish troops had completely
evacuated Amman and the surrounding area, and on 25 September
921918 the Australlian Light Horse under General Chaytor
entered the city and met with light resistance which was








forces quickly cleared this resistance and were shortly
thereafter met by a deputation of local leading citizens
which informed the British that no Ottoman troops remained
in the city and requested no measures be taken against the
people or property of the town. Miss Hacker summarizes the
effect which World War I had on Amman:
"So ended World War I in Amman, with a little loss and
some gain. The greatest loss to the town was not the
occasional bomb hit on the station buildings but the
destruction of the trees. . .Otherwise the town emerged
from the war in a rather better position than it had
been in before. It was now an established commercial
center; it had an increased and more cosmopolitan trading
population, which had been made prosperous by army con-
tacts, though gold had been replaced by a paper currency.
At the same time there was a metaled road to Es Salt, a
post and telegraphic service through Es Salt, a primary
school for boys, and a Municipal Council to administer
local affairs. It survived the next two years of political





IV. THE CIRCASSIAN UNDER AMIR ABDULLAH
"Political chaos" is a very descriptive term to apply-
to the events of the two years following World War I. The
situation is described in the following passage:
To the east of Palestine there lay the romantic
mountanious country called Trans Jordan, through which
the forces of the revolt had hacked their way northwards
to Damascus. Under the peace treaties it had been placed,
like Palestine, under the mandatory rule of Great Britain,
but the British were much too busy to bother with it, and
its status remained indistinct. It had no resources
whatsoever and was often overlooked, as an unimportant
corner of Syria, in the controversies aroused by Sykes,
Picot and the rest. Nor was anybody sure whether the
Balfour Declaration applied to it. Feisal administered
it for a time, during his short-lived sovereignty in
Damascus, and King Hussein had temporarily annexed the
southern part of the country, up to Maan; but by 1921
most of it had relapsed into bewildered disunity.
Three separate autonomous Governments had been
sponsored by the preoccupied British to rule its 350*000
people, and six Arabic-speaking Englishmen tried to
instill some sense of civic logic into the place... In
this they failed. Hastily and hazily assembled into
Council of Elders, the chieftains evolved their laws and
administered their judgement with a blith disregard
for precedent, sometimes declining into tribal feuds,
sometimes reviving their fortunes by selling worthless
oil concessions to perepatitic adventurers. There was
a National Government of Noab, whose President was a
young Englishman called Alec Kirkbride; and up the road
there was a Government of Amman, whose President was
Kirkbride ' s younger brother Alan; and most of these young
Britons seem to have had a pleasant time with their
likeable unruly wards; and the Arab chieftains were, by
and large, not altogether displeased with their free and
easy, hit and run, trigger-happy form of society. 9^
This situation continued until 21 August 1920 when, •*
in an effort to bring the area greater political stability,
94Morris, J., The Hashemite Kings , Patheon Books Inc.,
1959, p. 87.
9 S
^Bentwich, N. , England in Palestine , London, 1932, p. 52.
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the first British High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir
Herbert Samuel, met with a collection of notables in
Es Salt and proposed the formation of five local auton-
omous areas, Ajlan, Deir Yusuf , Jerash, Es Salt and Al
Karak. The common characteristics of the five were, "none
had international political status, each was under the
guidance of a British political officer, the most powerful
local tribal chief was made governor and each government
96had a representative advisory council.'
This arrangement does not appear to have involved any
Circassians, at least as far as records and interviews can
ascertain. The position of the Circassians was particularly
insecure at this time owing to their support of the Ottoman
effort during the war and the preference which the British
exhibited for dealing with the Arab tribes. However, while
the British did avoid dealing with certain Circassian leaders
in the post war era, such as Mirza Pasha, it should be
remembered that the Circassians retained, in the minds of the
English public, the image which had been created for them in
their struggles with the Russians. Additionally the Cir-
cassians more closely resembled the English in their physical
appearance. The Circassians still regarded the British as
their supporters, against the Russians, notwithstanding the
conflicts of the last war. But primary in the situation






type. The Circassians had been under the continuous
sponsorship of a major power for several centuries and
the lack of such sponsorship was a new and dangerous
situation, especially in the chaotic political atmosphere
of Trans Jordan. As Aqil Abidi points out the British
attempt to stabilize the area was a failure:
"Many Trans Jordanians were not pleased with this
arrangement. Desire for a single Arab state and appre-
hension of the Zionists persisted. These were clearly
reflected in a 16 point petition presented to Major F.
R. Somerset, the British Political officer at Umm Qays
in Ajlun, by a number of Shaykhns . The petition demanded
an Arab Amir, no relationship with the Palestine government,
check on Zionist immigration and fixation of the River
Jordan as the western boundary of the area. The British
Government conceded some of their points and noted the
others. But the factors which obstructed the British
experiment were the continuing tribal turbulence on the
one hand and the lack of co-ordination among the local
governments on the other. British political officers,
on their part, played one government off against the
other with consummate skill. British anxiety was increased
when, following repeated raids by the tribesmen of the
area into Syria, the French Government hinted at its
annexation. In addition, Britain was harassed by a set
of complex war-time problems developing in Palestine,
Iraq, Nejd and the Hejaz. At this juncture, the
appearance of Prince Abdullah, the second son of Sharif
Husain, at Maan in November 1920, decided Britains next
move. What followed subsequently gave a new turn to
Trans Jordan' s history, leading to the creation of an
Amirate. "97
Emir Abdullah arrived in Maan, an area in southern
Trans Jordan currently under the control of the Hejaz
v government, on 11 November 1920 with the express and
intention of raising an army and marching on Damascus to
restore his brother, Faisal, to the throne of Syria. Upon
97Abidi, A. H. H.
,
Jordan A Political Study 19^-8-1957
,
Asia Publishing House, 1965» P^ 5-
67

his arrival he was received with very mixed reactions and
was warned, by telegram from the governor of Salt, that
if he had come for political purposes he would be met
with opposition. Abdullah replied, "I am visiting Trans-
jordan to occupy as directed by the Royal Arab Government
of Syria, I am acting for His Majesty King Faisal and
98it is your duty to receive your orders from me.
Abdullah then declared himself regent for his brother
Faisal, set up the temporary headquarters of the Arab
government of Syria and issued his call for a "jihad" to
liberate Syria from the French. The British took no action
other than to diplomatically attempt to dissuade Abdullah,
since they were bound to support the French mandate under
the agreements reached at the San Remo Conference.
While at Maan, Abdullah was joined by a large number,
99perhaps several hundred former army officers and ad-
ministrative officials from Faisal's short lived government.
These were to be part of the core of Abdullah's government
and would also cause much disaffection for Abdullah and
his administration during the early years of the Emirate.
In early January 1921 Abdullah dispatched one of his aides
,
Sharif Ali al-Harithi, to Amman to secure the support of
the local nationalists. In a series of meetings al-Harithi
convinced the majority of notables in Amman that support for
Abdullah was the most wise of all possible alternatives.
^ Abdullah, I. , Memoirs of King Abdullah , The Philosophi-
cal Library, I960, p. 193.
"Mahmoud, A. A. , "King Abdullah and Palestine" (Ph.D.
dissertation, Georgetown University, April 1972).
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Abdullah arrived in Amman on 9 February 1921 and
was met by a large contingent of notables from Amman and
the surrounding villages. Present among them were Mirza
Pasha and Othman Hickmat, the two major Circassian leaders
to emerge from World War I and the following two years of
political chaos. Muhammad and Said el-Nufti may also have
been among them, accounts vary as to their presence, but
it is very likely that they would also be present at such
an important event.
For both Abdullah and the Circassians the logical
attraction was too strong to be ignored. Emir Abdullah had
by this time received several communications from his brother
Faisal and his father King Hussein discouraging him from con-
tinuing his campaign to liberate Syria. The logical
alternative was the establishment of some type of local
government in the Trans Jordan area, sponsored by the British
and ruled by Abdullah. The Circassians were a stable minority,
with a tradition of successful military activity against the
Arab tribes of the area. They owned a large portion of the
land in Amman and the surrounding area. With the Arab
nationalist sentiments currently on the rise , they were in a
particularly insecure position.
For the Circassians, Abdullah was the ideal sponsor.
He fit both the cultural and political model for a leader




a devout Moslem, with an impeccable geneology, he was
familiar with Circassians as a result of his service in
Constantinople, he was in need of a loyal local military
force and finally, he possessed the largest military force
in the immediate area. Mirza Pasha and Othman Hickmat "both
immediately volunteered to join Abdullah in his campaign
to liberate Syria. They also proposed the formation of
a personal bodyguard for the Emir, composed of Circassians
in their traditional combat dress. This offer was accepted
and a forty man unit was formed, which remains to this day.
The Circassians had allied themselves with Abdullah, firmly
and openly, at a time in which Abdullah's fortunes were
unsure. This was never forgotten by Abdullah and was referred
, . 102to on several occasions.
The events which led to the British decision to install
Abdullah as Emir of the newly created state of Trans Jordan
are discussed in great depth in several excellent works by
Glubb, Peake and others.
Once installed as Emir, Abdullah was faced with a
number of situations upon which the success of his reign
was to hang.
The first major decision was the selection of a capital.
Abdullah was confronted with two major choices in this
101
Mr. Bak, 25 May 1978.
102Interview with LTC Jamal and Mr. Bak, Jordanian
Embassy, Washington D.C., 26 May 1978.
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regard, Amman or Es Salt. Amman was chosen, a critical
choice to the political future of the Circassians. The
choice of Amman was made most probably because of its
location and position as a commercial center. Es Salt had
been the major administrative center under the Ottoman
Empire, but the population, almost evenly divided Moslems
and Christians, had a history of social and political
instability. The decision to adopt Amman as the capital was
formalized in the 1928 law which was quite advantageous to
the Circassians and will be discussed further.
103Abdullah's second move was to establish, in July 1921, J
a Council of Ministers responsible to him. This council did
not represent the local Trans Jordanian populace, but rather
was predominantly composed of Syrian followers of Faisal who
still believed that Abdullah would march north and free
Syria from the French. These were members of the Istiqlal
party and their leader, Rashid Tali, was installed as the
first President of the Advisory Council. Nor did Abdullah
attempt to disabuse the Istiqlal members of the belief that
the Syrian campaign was still viable. He claimed that the
British had promised him the Kingdom of Syria and the
agreement to refrain from any hostile acts was temporary,
for a period of six months. "In six months," said Abdullah,
"Churchill would be able to congratulate us in the return







The overwhelming presence of the non-Trans Jordanian
populace in the government made an impression on Major
Jarvis , the biographer of Peake Pasha who wrote:
"Every important post in the government at that time
was filled "by a Syrian or a Damascine Arab of the Istia lal
party, whose one aim was to extract as much money as
possible from Trans Jordan to carry on the war against
France and to use the country as a base for operations
in Syria. "105
This situation caused one Circassian leader, Said
al -Mufti to openly break with Abdullah. His tribe, the
Karbardey, was the largest Circassian tribe in Jordan.
This opposition to Abdullah had no immediate effect, since
the opposition was one of coffee-shop rhetoric rather than
active measures but it did establish for Mufti the reputation
of a radical background which, combined with the fact that
he was a Circassian, was to provide him with opportunities
in the coming years
.
Although few natives were afforded the opportunity to
participate in the administration, the number of Circassians
who were employed in government service was much higher, by
percentage of population, than the native Arab Trans Jordanians
This was particularly true in the military, which will be
more fully covered later.
In April of 1921, matters came to a head with the
members of the Istiqlal party. Britain had indicated
*Jarvis , C . S . , Arab Command; The Biography of LTC ?.
G. Peake Pasha , Hutchinson, 19^3. p. 107.
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that British interests would not be served in the area by
the continued presence of the Istiqlal members in the
Trans Jordanian government. Abdullah had, by this time,
established a more complete power base with the natives of
the area and saw that "his chance to secure stable rule in
Trans Jordan and possibly extend its territorial boundaries
was to support British interests completely. Thus he decided
not to make any more compromises with the nationalists. He
removed them from their government positions, which he then
filled with less politically-minded local leaders. Next,
he declared these nationalists to be 'foreigners' and con-
sequently deprived them of all their political rights and
privileges. Not only did Abdullah block their activities
but he also created a legal distinction between Arabs on the
basis of territory.
"
Another major task which confronted Abdullah was the
necessity to establish security in the Emirate. Prior to
his arrival this task had been the responsibility of the
British government and had been undertaken by Captain F. G.
Peake. Captain Peake had been sent to Amman in April 1920
to form a security force. Prior to Abdullah's arrival in
Amman, Peake had little success in recruiting any force.
Peake left Amman to attend the Cairo Peace Conference and
upon his return was selected as one of Abdullah's British






This force got off to a very difficult start, suffering
major reverse at Kerak in April of 1922. Early in 1923
the force was completely reorganized, the elements within
it who were Syrian and therefore politically inclined, dis-
charged and the force renamed the Arab Legion. The
Trans Jordanian natives were still reluctant to enlist, with
the exception of the Circassians, who made up perhaps as
much as 30% of the force. From this time onward the one
of the two major areas of interaction between the government
and Circassians became the army. In the terminology of The
Civic Culture this was an area of "social mobility" in which
the Circassians believed that they could achieve high status
in their culture. The other area was of course, politics
.
This will be discussed at length in the final chapter.
The events which transpired between the British and Emir
Abdullah in the Summer of 1924 have been discussed in great
detail elsewhere and have little impact on the main topic
of this paper other than to emphasize the insecurity of
British support for Abdullah. Abdullah was in the end
forced by the British to accept strict British supervision in
the matter of finances and his administration on the whole was
brought under tighter British control.
1 no
Peake, F. G. , "Trans -Jordan" Journal of the Royal
Central Asian Society , July 1939. p. 382.
109Mr. Bak and LTC Jamal , 26 May 1978.
Dann, U. , "The Political Confrontation of Summer 1924
in Trans Jordan, " Middle Eastern Studies , May 1976, p. 159-168.
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The major efforts on the part of the Emir's government
between 192^ and 1927 were the establishment of public
security, the construction of public works such as highways
and the repair of the Hejaz railway, the establishment of a
system of courts and the reorganization of land tenure and
taxation. The last category was of special concern to the
Circassians since their chief occupation was one of
agriculture. Most of the government documents from the
Ottoman period had been either lost or destroyed. The
situation is described in the following passage,
"During the Turkish regime Trans Jordan was regarded by
the Government as more of a liability than an asset, the
administration, particularly in regard to land, had been
very much neglected, and it was only when the Department
of Lands and Surveys was formed in 1929 that land
administration was placed on a firm basis.
The task that confronted this new department was indeed
a formidable one. There were no maps, no surveyors, and the
Land Registries were in a hopeless state of confusion. In
1926 Sir Ernest Dowson was asked by the Trans Jordanian
Government to study the existing system of land tenure
and land taxation in the country and to make recommendations
as to the reforms and changes in the system of administration
he considered necessary. In the body of his report the
following pregnant paragraph appears:
Throughout the length and breadth of the country there
will hardly be found a .handful of cases in which the
Government can extract from the Land Register the name of
the lawful possessor of any given parcel of "miri" land
(Crown lands with a heritable right of occupation by the
cultivator) or in which the occupant of such land can
establish therefrom his right to lawful possession. Con-
tinuously everywhere the possession of "miri" land is being
disposed of, inherited and seized in disregard of law and




;Land Problems in Trans Jordan,
"




The survey of lands was undertaken in 1928 and completed
in 1933 • This survey gave the Circassians firm title over
their lands. Not only the lands under cultivation or the
sites of dwellings were assigned ownership hut also tracts
which were surrounded by cultivated lands such as the Wadi
112El Haddedeh running through what is now downtown Amman.
At the time of this survey, this land, as well as other
uncultivated areas, were essentially worthless "but assigned
ownership nonetheless by the meticulous British administrators.
As Amman and the surrounding villages grew this land became
quite valuable. This topic will be dealt with more fully
in subsequent passages.
The year 1928 saw the promulgation of several laws in
Trans Jordan which had a great effect on the status of the
Circassians. These laws were the outcome of the Anglo-
Trans Jordanian agreement of 1928 which provided for the
enactment of a series of laws which would pave the way for a
constitutional government. The first major step was the
enactment of a constitution on February 20, 1928. The
Constitution heavily favored the British control or at least
active supervision of all important government activities and
what powers it did not grant to the British were reserved for
the Emir. The important section of the document for the
Circassians was the division of Trans Jordan into four districts
and one autonomous territory. The autonomous territory was
completely surrounded by the central or Belga district and
112
Mr. Bak, 25 May 1978.
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in addition to Amman included the Circassian villages of
Naur, Wadi Seir, Suweilih and Ruseifa. This effectively
removed the majority of the Circassian citizens from involve-
ment in Arab tribal politics and made them directly
responsible to the Crown in the daily administration of the
area. This measure benefited both the Circassian within
the autonomous "territory of the capital," and the Emir.
Since the Circassians were not involved with the tribal
politics they were not required to engage in tribal politics
and thus confuse the direct link which had been established
between the Emir and themselves. This also eliminated the
possibility that the Circassians, a powerful military group,
would ally themselves with another tribe or collection of
tribes in an effort to overthrow the administration.
The second move toward a constitutional monarchy also
directly effected the Circassians. The electoral law,
promulgated on 15 August 1928 contained a special section
regarding minorities. This section allocated one seat be
reserved for a Circassian, for every five thousand inhabitants
versus the one seat for every twenty-seven thousand for the
remainder of the population (excluding Christians, who
also received a special legislative allocation under the law) . J
This allocation was shared by the Circassians with the
Chechens, another smaller group of Caucasian Muslims who




These three measures, the land survey, the Constitution
stipulating an autonomous "capital territory" and the
Legislative Law of 1928 with its special provisions for
Circassian involvement in the legislature, formalized
the Circassian status in Jordanian society and insured for
them continued political security for as long as the
Hashemite regime remained viable.
Thus far we have examined the role of the Circassians
as a whole in the government and the relationship which
was gradually being established and formalized between the
government on the one hand and the Circassians on the other.
As with any group, dealing with the group as a whole can
lead to misconception, and overgeneralization.
Three major Circassian families appear to have been
politically active in the central administration. The
first was the Hikmat family represented by Omar Hickmat.
The Hickmat family were members of the Kabardey clan and
Omar Hickmat was the first Circassian to hold a post on the
early Council of Ministers, as Minister of Justice. This
family has remained active in government, but on an appoint-
ive, rather than elected basis and three of Omar Hickmat'
s
sons presently serve in appointed positions in the present
government.
The Mirza family also remained active in politics,
represented by Mirza Pasha's son Wasfi Pasha. The Mirza
family had remained staunch supporters of Abdullah, although
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Mirza Pasha was never able to personally participate in
politics due to British opposition.
Said al-Mufti is the most often mentioned Circassian
leader and emerged as the most powerful Jordanian-Circassian
politican by 1928, although his power was frequently
challenged by the Mirza family, not the same Mirza family
to which Mirza Pasha belonged but the family of Abbas Pasha
Mirza who for several cabinets, alternated service with
Said al-Mufti.
The politics of Said al-Mufti can best be described as
totally loyal but also independent. Opposed to the admin-
istration during the early twenties, Said al-Mufti continued
to act independently throughout the 1930 ' s, supporting the
government on most major issues but occasionally acting as
a leader of the opposition. This qualified opposition
enabled Mufti to survive, but also gained for him immense
popularity in the disaffected portions of the Trans Jordanian
population. This became especially important after 19^8
with the advent of the Palestinians into Jordanian politics.
Said al-Mufti was a member of several political parties,
and was elected as the first Circassian representative to
the 1929 Legislative Council, the first Legislative Council
elected. The first order of business for the new Legislative
Council was approval of the British-Trans Jordanian Agreement
of 1928. The Council immediately drafted a revised Agreement
The practice of simultaneous membership in two or





to take the place of the existing Agreement. As can be
expected the new agreement called for sweeping changes, "both
in the relationship between Trans Jordan and Britain and the
Trans Jordanian government itself. * Under heavy pressure
and after many delays the Legislative Council finally
approved the Agreement as submitted on June k , 1929. Several
months later a crisis was precipitated when the Council
refused to pass the annual budget law. The Council was
dissolved on February 9> 1931 and new elections held on
June 1, 1931*
Throughout the two crises above Said al -Mufti had
supported the government. The Second Legislative Council
contained only four members who had been elected to the
first, Said al -Mufti among them. None of the members of
the First Legislative Council who had voted "no'' on the
issue of the 1928 Agreement were ever again elected to
national office.
One author describes the subsequent events as follows:
"Initially, the second Legislative Council was not
as cooperative as the government wished it to be. The
elected members excluded the government appointed
members from the legal, administrative, and financial
committees of the Legislative Council. Excluding them
the legislative committees dramatized the separation of
legislative and executive functions. Subsequently,
the Legislative Council prevented the transaction of
legislative activities by failing to form a quorum. The
Emir was faced with two alternatives: to dissolve the







dismissed the Chief Minister and replaced him with
Ibrahim Hashem,the countries leading jurist and one of the
principal pillars of the Hashemite dynasty. Hashem formed
his Executive Council on November 18 , 1931 of "the two
members of the former Council and three members of the
Legislative Council. He thus conciliated the governments
critics in the legislature and assured the transaction
of legislative business in the Council. .. This marked the
beginning of an uninterrupted harmonious relations
between the Executive and Legislative Council, which
lasted until independence. "117
One of the three members of the Legislative Council was
Said al -Mufti whom subsequently served on three of the
four legislatures which met between 1931 and 19^7.
Trans Jordan between 1931 and 19^7 was a fairly peaceful
country, devoid of political instability and insulated
from the effects of World War II. Agriculture, government
and the military were the primary careers of the Circassians.
For social and recreational activities the Circassian
Charity Organization was founded in 1930, with branches
in Jerash, Naur, Wadi Seir and Zerqua with a women's branch
founded sometime later. This organization actively promoted
the preservation of Circassian customs and languages and
presently sponsors twenty-one scholarships for students
to study at the University of Nalchick, at present the
center of Circassian study in the Caucasus. The Circassian
Charity Association sponsors a school built 5 years ago,
between Naur and Wadi Seir which teaches the Circassian
language in addition to the other required subjects at
present there are 108 students in grades 1-6. 1:L ^ The Ahli
117Aruri, p. 85.
118„ Jordanian Circassians Hang on to Their Traditions,"
Jordan Times
. 13 May 1978, p. 2.
-L1 " Jordan Times , p. 2.
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120Sports Club was founded in 19^ and became the predominant
force in Jordanian sports. Although non-Circassians were
permitted to join, the Ahli Club was, and remains today,
primarily Circassian. Several other smaller organizations
and clubs also were founded for sports or cultural activities.
The 1930 ' s are the only period in which several surveys
were taken which distinguished between Circassian and non-
Circassian. Subsequent censuses or surveys have not
distinguished between the Jordanian citizens on the basis
of ethnic background or (in the case of the Christians)
religion. The reasons for this were fully covered in the
introduction, little benefit would be gained from emphasizing
differences which were all to prevalent. Nonetheless the
British had no such sensibilities and a census taken in

















121Great Britain, Report by His Britanic Ma.iesty's
Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Admin-
istration of Palestine and Trans .Jordan for the year 1933,
Colonial No. 9^ , His Majesty's Stationary Office, 193^, p. 305,
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The total population of Trans Jordan was given as
122 . •
300,000, the Circassians thus comprising approximately
2% of the population. These figures "become much more
meaningful when compared to the following survey taken
in 1937. 123
OFFICIALS OF THE TRANS JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT OTHER
THAN BRITISH (1938)
ARABS BORN IN TRANS JORDAN 539
ARABS BORN OUTSIDE TRANS JORDAN 31
3
CIRCASSIANS BORN IN TRANS JORDAN 68
OTHERS £_
925
Thus while the Circassians comprised only 2% of the
population they occupied almost 7% of the government positions,
including occupancy of one of the five positions on the
Executive Council.
The military was also a preferred career for the
Circassians, and one in which they enjoyed great success.
The Circassians preferred and continue to prefer today, to
be placed in all Circassian units if possible. The
explanation of the Circassian involvement in the military
necessitates some background.
122Great Britain, Colonial No. 9^, P- 306.
^Great Britain, Report by His Britanic Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nation on
the Administration of Palestine and Trans .Jordan for the year
1937, Colonial No. 146
,




The initial military force organized by Captain F. G.
Peake was named the Trans Jordanian Reserve Force and was
composed primarily of Circassian and other, minority
personnel, the native Trans Jordanians not willing to
support the Force. This force was used primarily to compel
tribes to pay taxes and, with the assistance of the Royal
Air Force, to repel Wahhabi attacks from the south. The
Trans Jordanian Reserve Force was initially authorized a
124
strength of 750 men. Additionally a small police force
of perhaps 200 was "maintained also.
On October 22, 1923 an order was issued to merge
the police force with the Trans Jordanian Reserve Force
and the unit was subsequently re-named the Arab Legion.
By the beginning of 1924 the Arab Legion had reached a
strength of forty officers and 950 men in mounted and
dismounted units. The Circassians comprised two companies
of this force, approximately 30% with at least one Cir-
cassian officer, Wasfi Mirza, the son of Mirza Pasha,
127holding the rank of Captain. ' The Circassians still






127Mr. Bak, 25 May 1978
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of the Circassian companies were reputed to be the finest
in the Legion.
In 1926 the second High Commission for Palestine,
Field Marshal Lord Herbert C. Plumer moved to integrate
the military forces at his disposal. Consequently the
1 ? Q
Arab Legion was reduced from a strength of 1,^72 to 855
and given the duties of an urban police force.
The Trans Jordanian Frontier Force was established and
its headquarters moved from Palestine to Zarqa. Initially
this force was manned by 17 British officers and an unknown
number of Palestinians recruited from the gendarmerie there.
This force was not popular, being viewed as an instrument
of British control and, although a few Circassians joined,
most remained in the Arab Legion.
In 193^ "the Arab Leagion had reached a strength of
forty officers, three cadet officers and 1,002 men. '
This figure included the numbers of the Desert Patrol, an
all Bedouin unit, organized in 1926 to control tribal
affairs. The Legion slowly grew to a strength of 1,642
men in 1938. On 21 March 1939 the Legion commander,
F. G. Peake, resigned and was replaced by the commander







At this time the Circassians continued to hold a
disproportionate share of both the officer and enlisted
ranks in the Legion. While this is not of particular
significance now, the top ranks of the Legion being held
by British officers, it would become so with several
years when the British were invited to leave.
The major change which transpired in the Legion upon
Glubb's assumption to command was the reorganization of
the Legion from a basic police unit to a combat unit.
On September 16, 1939 Emir Abdullah declared war on Germany
and both he and Glubb hoped the Legion would be tested in
combat. Although they were used in several small actions
the Legion was never able to participate fully in combat
and their primary duty was the guarding of storage facilities
and roads. The war effort did succeed in raising the
authorization for the Legion and it emerged from World War
II with a strength of 8,000 men.
During the period 1927-19^7 the primary career for
the Circassians was agriculture and this period was
excellent in that a rapidly developing market in Palestine
was available to absorb the agricultural products. Emir
Abdullah had launched, early in his administration, a
settlement program for the Bedouin tribes which met with
limited success. As a part of this program a large number
of agricultural experts were brought from England and
development programs, to include all agricultural sectors,
was begun. Agricultural production, chiefly in wheat,
86

barley, fruit and livestock rapidly increased. -^1 The
Palestine market proved to be an economic boon to the
Circassians and by the early 19^0's they had acquired
the reputation as a landed and wealthy class. Several
of the families active in politics leased a portion of
their landholdings to other less prosperous Circassians.
The normal leasing process was that the land holders
would provide for all the material needs of the leasee,
shelter, food, clothing, etc. and at harvest the leasor
received a 75% share of the harvest. This arrangement
was the most common and was usually concluded for a period
of nine months, after which either party could cancel the
lease. In almost all occasions these agreements were
concluded within the same Circassian tribe.
The annexation of the West Bank of Palestine had
several ramifications for the Circassian community in
Jordan. The injection of the highly nationalistic
Palestinians into the still parochial Jordanian political
scene highlighted the status of the Circassians as a non-
Arab group within the state, although conversely this
effect benefited several of the Circassian political
leaders, Said al-Mufti in particular. One writer character-
ized the situation as follows:
"Said al-Mufti had a better reputation (among the
Palestinians). First, it was assumed that as a Circassian,
he would not jeopardize his community by persisting in
politics that proved unacceptable to the Palestinians.
131Castro, E. R. and Dotson, 0. inf., : 'Economic Geography
of Trans Jordan, " Economic Geography , April 1938, p. 121-130,
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Second, he himself dabbled in anti-regime politics in the
1930* s and it was felt he was responsive to public
opinion. Therefore, in an attempt to appease anti-
annexation feeling among the Palestinians in 1950 » King
Abdullah made Mufti the first post-annexation prime
minister, replacing Abu al-Huda, whom, the Palestinians
held responsible for the much resented Rhodes Armistice
Agreement of 19^9 • In office, Mufti earned the further
good will of the Palestinians when he eventually rejected
Abdullah's directives to work out a peace treaty with
Israel. m1 32
In his appointment as Prime Minister Said al-Muf ti had
become the first Circassian to be elected to the post.
Within the Circassian community this gave Mufti a position
of primacy which was to be challenged throughout the next
twenty years by Wasfi Mirza. Since, by tradition, only
one Circassian was appointed to the Cabinet this rivalry
could not be resolved by the appointment of both to cabinet
posts and King Abdullah and later King Hussein realized this
and skillfully played the two individuals and families
against one another.
For purpose of reference and clarity Annex A depicts
Circassian representation on the Jordanian Cabinets from
19^7 to present day. 1^
The formation of Israel and the acquisition of the
West Bank also had an economic effect on the Circassian
132J Bailey, C, "Cabinet Formation in Jordan," The
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank , American
Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1977,
p. 107.
-^'Chronology," Middle East Digest , 1947-1977.
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community. Although a large part of the market for
agricultural produce was lost following the war with Israel
this economic loss was more than compensated for by the
rapid rise in land values. Much of the land which the
Circassians had "been assigned in Amman and the surrounding
areas, land which was uncultivatable , was now prime
residential property.
One author describes the situation in Amman as follows:
"One obvious and immediate consequence of this influx
(of Palestinian refugees) was an astronomical rise in
rents and land values. A 3-room house, previously let
for L50 per annum ($160.00) could be let for L250 ($800.00)
per annum, with a stipulation of an advance payment of
one years rent for vacant possession. A furious con-
struction program was embarked on by contractors,
speculators and such refugees as had managed to salvage
some of their assets. "13^
In all fairness to the Circassian land owners, several
refugee camps were placed on Circassian land and remained,
13*5
without compensation for several years. v ^ But the total
economic effect of the influx was to endow the Circassians
with considerable economic gain. This would, in subsequent
years, shift the whole cultural emphasis of the next
generation of Circassian youth, away from politics and
toward the economic sphere. Patai characterizes the
Circassians of this time as follows:
L
^ Hacker, p. 39.
13%r. Bak, 25 May 1978.
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"Although the Circassians have become cultivators
in Jordan, (as well as Syria where a large number of them
were settled) , certain characteristics differentiate them
from their Arab fellahin neighbors. On their farms they
practice weeding, utilize wooden rakes, harrows and
scythes, use wagons for transportation, do not employ
women in agricultural labor, use stables for their horses
and sheds for their cows; many of them specialize as
masons, joiners, blacksmiths; their houses are widely
spaced, whitewashed and built in a modern style; they wear
their own distinctive garb, like to eat meat; practice
ceremonial abduction of brides; show no emotions in the
case of death (neither men nor women) ; the eldest son
inherits all property; etc. —all customs and practices
different from those of their Arab neighbors. Also they
lay greater stress on education, and literacy is more
frequent among them.
Lately, however, a tendency to assimilate to the
Arabs has become noticeable among them, in such matters
as language (they had previously spoken their own language)
and way of life. Intermarriage with Arabs has begun,
although for the time being only between Circassian men and
Arab women--as is usual between a socially superior and
inferior ethnic groups. At the same time, a tendency
toward assimilation to European customs is evident among
the Circassians. The younger people, for instance, tend
to exchange their old national costume for European style
clothing. "13°
Patai is correct in all details of this picture except his
comments on intermarriage between Circassians and Arabs.
In almost all cases, Circassian men were required to marry
within the family or tribe,'while Circassian women, with a
well deserved reputation for beauty among the Arabs, were
allowed to marry Arab men. The instances of intermarriage
were the exception rather than the rule and almost always





V. THE CIRCASSIANS UNDER KING HUSSEIN
The assassination of King Abdullah on July 20, 1951
initiated a struggle for power between the supporters of
Prince Talal , who was at that time in Switzerland undergoing
treatment for mental problems, and the supporters of Prince
Naif, Talal 's brother. Talal was supported by the anti-
British, West Bank elements, while Naif had the support of
the pro-British, East Bank population. This support was a
product more of expectations rather than experience from
past performance.
As Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Said
al -Mufti became the focus for two major operations. The
first was the speedy capture, trial and execution of those
responsible for the death of Abdullah, a task which was
accomplished, to almost everyone's surprise, within two
months. This quick dispatch' of justice prevented the
episode from becoming a major political topic.
More importantly, Said al-Mufti was regarded as neutral
in the contention over the throne and on August 7, 1951
flew to Switzerland to investigate Talal ' s condition.
He returned with the proposal that any decision should be
delayed until it could be medically ascertained whether
Talal was able to serve as King. Until this was determined
Naif would remain as regent. The compromise pleased everyone,
91

including the British, who had not yet formulated a policy
on the succession.
In early September 1951 Dr. Jamil Tutunji, the
Minister of Health and Social Affairs returned from
Switzerland and proclaimed Talal fit for the duties of
King. During this time the pro-Talal forces had gained
strength and the British had determined that the assumption
Talal would best serve Jordanian and British interests.
On September 5> the day after those convicted of plotting
Abdullah's assassination were hung, Talal was proclaimed
King. Five days later, in a move designed to forestall any
further efforts on the Crown by Naif, Amir Hussein was
proclaimed Crown Prince.
The struggle between Naif and Talal, or more accurately
Talal' s supporters, for the Crown continued due in a large
part to the recurrent sickness from which Talal suffered.
By January 20, 1952 Talal was again ill and sent to
Switzerland. He returned in February but departed again
in May. By June it was evident that Talal would not be
able to dispatch his duties as King. On August 11, 1952
Talal was disposed and Hussein proclaimed King. Prince
Naif also lost his position as Regent, after being charged
with plotting to take the throne through military action. ^
In declaring Hussein King and removing Naif as Regent, the
Parliment had compromised with both the pro and anti
British sectors of the populace and utilized what is
1
^ Shwadran, p. 31 3, n. 10
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known in American politics as the "dark horse candidate".
The move succeeded.
In the crucial times between July 20, 1951 when
Abdullah was assassinated and 2 May 1953 when King Hussein
assumed duties as King; Said al -Mufti served as both Vice
Prime Minister and Minister of Interior. These were
critical times for the Hashemi te Dynasty. During this
period a new constitution had been approved which made the
government answerable to the Parliament rather than the
King, a move which alleviated much of the criticism by the
anti-British elements. Also, a move to unite Jordan with
Iraq had been forestalled, a move which could have well
placed Jordan under the permanent domination of the branch
of the Hashemite family then ruling Iraq. The political
role of Said al -Mufti during this period, as well as for
several additional years, is best summarized in the following
passage
,
"Abdullah's aides presided over twelve of the sixteen
governments formed between July 1951 and May 1959* Four
men (Said al -Mufti, Tawfiq, Abu al-Huda. Samir al-
Rafai and Ibrahim Hashim) were exercising power not in
their own names but in the name of a dead King, a
demented one, and, after August 1952, one who had not yet
identified himself. They thrust themselves to the summit
of the Jordanian political system not in their own interest,
although they manifestly enjoyed the fruits of office, but
in the interest, as they understood it, of the dynasty and
its external prop. '139
The Arab Legion and Royal Bodyguard had continued to
enjoy Circassian enlistment and a high percentage, when
119^ 7Hurewitz, J. C, Middle East Politics: The Military
Dimension , Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1969, p. 317.
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measured against other groups by population, were officers.
The Legion had distinguished themselves in the Arab-Israeli
War of 19^8. While very few details as to specific
Circassian involvement are available it is known that
three Circassians, Izzat Hassan, Fauzi Mahir and Mohammad
Idris, saw action in the campaign. All three eventually
became Chiefs of Staff of the Jordanian Army and General
Idris is currently serving in that capacity.
The early 1950' s also saw the beginnings of the
Jordanian Air Force under the supervision of King Hussein,
who earned the first Jordanian's pilots wings issued. An
early recruit to this branch was Ibrahim Othman who eventually
rose to the position of Commander of the Air Force.
The two military units which drew the greatest participation
from the Circassians were the Royal Bodyguard, enlarged to
Brigade size in the early 50 ' s and the Jordanian Commandos
, ihryformed in 1956 « While the Royal Bodyguard eventually
declined to a strictly ceremonial unit, now possessing only
seven members, the Commando unit has become the foremost
~\ lip
elite unit in Jordan. It is predominantly Circassian
(approximately 7 5~Q0%) and was heavily used in the civil
strife during 1970.
^ULTC Jamal and Mr. Bak, May 26, 1978.
Interview with LTC G. Landry, Fort Braff, N.C., 15
May 1977.




The event which had the largest impact upon Circassians
serving in the military was the relief, on 1 March 195&,
of General Glubb from command of the Arab Legion. Shortly
after Glubb ' s dismissal the remaining British officers
were relieved. Mr. J. C. Hurewitz characterizes the
situation as follows:
"The experiment with representative government
coincided with the Jordanization of the army officer
corps. This meant that at a time when Hussein was
agreeing to surrender basic political powers in the cabinet
and to the parliament, he was also undermining his
capacity to reimpose the traditional full powers of the
monarchy, should he feel threatened by the experiment.
He had already weakened the armie's officer corps,
abandoned a tested mode of financing the entire military
establishment and voluntarily extenuated his personal
control over that establishment. The withdrawal of the
British officers brought to the top command men of
doubtful military ability and, from the dynasty's point
of view, of doubtful loyalty. "1^3
The Circassian officers who were in position to rise
in rank upon the departure of the British were an exception
to this statement. They had risen to the officer ranks
under the British due to their political loyalty and, more
importantly, their technical knowledge.
The lack of technical knowledge of ability among East
Bank Jordanians in the early post-World War II era had
made it necessary to recruit increasing numbers of West
Bank Palestinians for the army, especially the officer
corps. Emerging from World War II with a strength of
1 LL "| lie














Following the famous Zarqua Affair on 13 April 1957
the Jordanian officer corps was purged, with 22 officers
being tried by military courtsmartial for attempting to
overthrow the King and perhaps as many as 200 additional
officers relieved from duty. No Circassian officers were
implicated in the plot or relieved from duty as political
• 1 149
risks.
The new constitution, adopted in 8 January 1952 had
brought to the country a new measure of political freedom
and a resultant rise in political activity and violence.
This did little to effect the Circassian community who
elected Said al -Mufti and Wasf i Mirza or Abbas Pasha Mirza
to Parliament on a routine basis as they had for almost two
decades. Between 3 May 1954 and 30 May 1955 Wasfi Mirza
served as the Minister of Agriculture. This cabinet position
was of great importance to the Circassians due to their large
land holdings and the intense agricultural efforts which were
undertaken in Jordan at that time. The Ministry of Agri-
culture was heavily staffed with Circassians, both then and
now, and Wasf i Mirza was to occupy this position of Minister





148Interview with Mr. Adeeb Shalakho , Patterson, N.J.,
22 May 1978.
1 9Mr. Adeeb Shalakho, 22 May 1978.
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On May 30 1955, Said al-Mufti was called upon by King
Hussein to assume the position of Prime Minister to lead
the country into the Bagdad Pact. The Pact was intensely
disliked within Jordan and Hussein felt that Said al-Mufti,
a popular figure with the Palestinians, would be able to
convince the cabinet to ratify the Pact. Although he
selected for his cabinet, members from the West Bank whom
had formerly served as civil servants and therefore usually
more tractable, he was unsuccessful and submitted the
resignation of his cabinet on November ^th. He was again
called upon to serve as Prime Minister on May 22, 195& in
an attempt to stem the intense pressure, by the National
Socialist Party, to bring Jordan into the Egyptian government
but received a vote of no confidence on June 20, 195° and
was forced to dissolve Parliament. The cabinet of Prime
Minister Nabulsi which served from October 29, 195& to
April 10, 1957 and culminated in the Zarqua affair, was with
the exception of the Civil War in 1970, the strongest
threat encountered by the Hashemite Dynasty. In an attempt
to subvert the governmental influence of the Mirza and
Mufti families, the Circassian Kurma family, who had become
quite weathy as a result of the land speculation boom of
194-8, strongly supported the National Socialist Party.
While they were unable to become elected or serve in an
official government position, they possessed considerable
influence throughout the period. When King Hussein clamped
down on political activity on April 2^, 1957 the Khurma
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family lost its political influence and has not been
active in government in either an elected or appointed
capacity since.
In the wake of the Zarqua affair and the intense
political activity by the National Socialist Party, King
Hussein faced the basic decision as to whether the country
would continue to be subjected to internal political
violence and external threat, with the probably outcome
the dissolution of the monarchy, or to end all political
activity and rule the country through martial law. He
chose the latter and on 25 April 1957 he declared martial
law. Said al -Mufti was asked to serve in the new cabinet,
but for reasons of ill health, was unable to serve, and
retired from public life for six years.
Martial law was lifted in November of 1958 and
Wasfi Mirza represented the Circassians in the sensitive
positions of Minister of Interior and Defense until 1962.
The outcome of the land boom of 19^8 was that several
Circassian families, most from the Kabardey tribe, rose
to great financial prominence. In works on Jordan, when
Circassians are mentioned they are normally characterized
as land owners or landlords. This wealth, together with
the propensity of the wealthy Circassian families to
send their youth to college in America or England, gave
rise to a new class of Circassians, the technologists
and financeers. The four families usually mentioned in
connection with land holdings are the Mufti, the Task,
the Mirza and the Khurma.
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In the economic spheres the Mufti family assisted
in the establishment of the Jordanian Central Bank and
continue to hold a major portion of shares in the Bank.
In this connection Izz al-Din el-Mufti, the younger
brother of Said al-Mufti, has held a directorship in the
Bank since its' establishment in the early 1960's. He
also held the position of Finance Minister in the Cabinet
on three occasions between 1962 and 1966. The Mirza
family is chiefly represented by four brothers who seemed
to have each specialized in a specific area. Said and
Izz al-Dinn have already been discussed. The remaining
two brothers are Dr. Shawket al-Mufti, a medical doctor
and author of Heros and Emperors in Circassian History ,
represents the family in cultural activities, having held
the presidency of the Circassian Charitable Organization
on several occasions. He is the acknowledged authority
on Circassian history and customs in the country. Little
information is available about the fourth brother Raifat.
The Tash family are also involved in banking, holding
a directorship on the board of the Jordanian National
(Ahli) Bank. The Tash family has never been involved in
elective politics but has accepted several appointive
positions. The current ambassador to Canada is a member
of the Tash family. They are much smaller in number than
the Mirza' s or Mufti's and while very well respected in
the Circassian community, have little political influence.
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The Khurma family has already been discussed in
regard to their attempt at political influence. This
attempt forestalled any further efforts and while very
rich in land holdings they have little influence within
the Circassian community.
The decade of the 60 ' s saw little major changes for
the Circassians in Jordan. This was a period of relative
political stability for Jordan and the Circassian
community prospered and grew. The lack of any census
material which discriminates between ethnic origin reduces
any statement of population to an educated guess. The
most accurate estimate for 1961 is between 20-25 thousand
people. A special emnity appeared to grow between the
Circassians, who represented a bloc unquestionably loyal to
the monarchy, and the Palestinians, who saw King Hussein
as a primary cause for the loss of their homeland. This
enmity intensified following the loss of the West Bank in
I967 and Circassian homes became an especially common
target for Palestinian "fund gathering activities."
The method of one of these was related to me:
"In late 19^9 I had just returned from a two year
mission in Bahrain, assisting in the establishment of
an Infantry School. I joined the Jordanian Commandos in
i960 and became an officer in 1965 after finishing my
officers training. One night, several days after I
had returned home, the front door was opened, with no
warning, we had always left our doors unlocked, and three
men entered with machine guns. They were Palestinians and
told us they were collecting money for the PLC This
was something strange to me and I didn't know what to do,
5 Weightman, p. 28.
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but we gave them some money and told them it was all
we had. They knew I was an officer and said I should
pay more since I would not fight to get back their
homeland, but I told them I din't have any more money.
They left and I asked my family about this and they said
that it had already happened twice in the past and the
Palestinians took a lot of money from the Adigah because
they thought we were all rich. This made me damn
mad'' and when I talked to the other fellows in my unit
I found out it was true. After that I was stopped at
several road blocks and if they knew I was Circassian
they would always demand money. My unit had several
meetings with the King (over a period of several months)
to tell him about these things and demand we be allowed
to take some action but he always was able to persuade
us to be patient. King Hussein is a great leader and
he felt sympathy for all his people and wanted only peace.
We were his soldiers and would obey him in everything
he said but finally they pushed even him too far and
we got our chance. "151
The defeat of the Palestinian units in Jordan ended,
or at least rendered negligible the last major threat to
the Circassians in Jordan. This victory was not without
its casualties however, political as well as physical.
Upon the outbreak of fighting in Amman the al -Mufti
1 ^2brothers left the country for an extended stay abroad.
The resultant loss of prestige was fatal for the political
influence of the Mirza family.
The process of assimilation, which had begun in the
early part of the century when Amman lost its totally
Circassian character, had developed to a point where a
concerted effort had to be made among the Circassian
population to preserve the language, customs and traditions.
151CPT Ahmad Suweilih, 26 May 1977.
152Mr. Bak, 25 May 1978.
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One author characterized the situation of the Circassians
in 1967 as follows:
Recent decades have witnessed a rapid transformation
of this community from a traditional, agrarian, ethnic
minority into a modern, urbanized, Arabized, key element
in Jordan. Except at occasional dance festivals in Wadi
Seir and Jerash, almost no one of either sex under forty
ever wears the traditional and distinctive garb of the
Adigah. All adult Circassians are bilingual (Circassian
and Arabic) among the young educated adults most are
trilingual: Circassian, Arab and English. Many are
graduates of universities in Lebanon, Egypt, the United
Kingdom and the United States. Since the influx of
Palestinian refugees have transformed Amman from a
sleepy, Circassian village into a turbulent Arab city,
many Circassians have completely abandoned the language
of their ancestors.
Although a few Circassian intellectuals have embarked
upon a campaign to teach a written Circassian language
using the Latin alphabet, they have met with no success.
The publications of the Circassian Association are all
in Arabic. When one Jordanian Circassian writes to
another he invariably does so in Arabic—not even in
Circassian using the Arabic alphabet. Indeed, although
most Circassians are described as bilingual, they tend
to be more fluent and more at ease in Arabic than
Circassian.
Increasingly, especially in the Amman area,
Circassians are distinguishable from the Arabs only by
their physical appearance. Even then, the differences
are often quite subtle, and the outsider may easily fail
to notice the distinction. In general, (and there are
always exceptions) the Circassians tend to be stockier
and fairer than the Arabs. The Semitic traits often
associated with Arabs are lacking in them. While Arabs
tend to be dolichocephalic, the Circassians tend to be
brachycephalic. In addition, among some of the Adigah
and Chechens there appears to have been an intrusion of
Tartar racial strains in the past.
Even the minor racial strains are becoming obscured
by the growing amount of intermarriage between Circassians
and Arabs. Intermarriage between the two groups has of
course taken place since the early days of the Circassian
settlement. However, in the past it was on limited scale
and possessed a peculiar configuration of its own.
Contrary to the pattern described by Patai in his The
Kingdom of Jordan (p. 21) when intermarriage formerly
occured it was between Circassian women and Arab men--
a reversal of the usual situation between a socially
superior and a social subordinate ethnic group. This
variation on the practice observed in so many other
societies is partially explained by the fact that both
the Arabs and the Circassians concerned were of high
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social status in the Arab community. Invariably, as
might be expected in patriachal societies, these "mixed"
offspring while proud of their Circassian legacy, identify
themselves with their father's people. In recent years,
as the number of intermarriages increase, some Circassian
men have taken Arab women as wives. Nevertheless
endogamous marriage among Circassians is still the expected,
desired, and usual pattern. 153
The conclusions and analysis of the political status
of the present day Circassian population will be presented




VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Circassian minority in Jordan emerged from the
civil war of 1970 as a wealthy, influencial, and, perhaps
most important, loyal and patriotic group. Although the
departure from Amman of the leading members of the al -Mufti
family did damage the political fortunes of that leading
group, the majority of the Circassians had been actively
involved with the struggle firmly on the side of the
Hashemite Dynasty. The return of stability after the
civil war marked a return to security for both Hussein
and the Circassians.
As mentioned earlier, the pattern of Circassian
involvement in the government had been undergoing a shift
throughout the previous decade. The phenomenon of a
Circassian cabinet minister in almost every cabinet
began to disappear in the late i960 ' s and since April 19
>
1970 only one Circassian has served in the Cabinet, and
he served in the position of Minister of Agriculture, a
far less powerful post than the traditional Interior or
Vice Premier. Late in 197^ Said al-Mufti had retired from
his position as Head of the House of Notables, a largely
ceremonial position, drawing to an end an era of political
domination by the al-Mufti family.
10^

The new trend, reflecting either the ineffectiveness
of the political system, or the new technological emphasis
depending upon one's point of view, is away from Parlia-
mentary (i.e., elective) positions and toward appointive
15^positions.
The economic events of 197^-1976 saw a land boom in
Amman and Wadi Seir of unprecedented proportions.
Following the outbreak of active hostilities in Beirut,
foreign business flocked to Amman. One source character-
ized the period as follows:
"After things began to get difficult in Lebanon,
many of the foreign businesses in Beirut, that was the
center for international trade in the whole region,
needed a new place with security. Amman had recovered
from the difficulties by that time and the government
was quite hopeful of getting these businesses to move
to Jordan. Some new laws were passed to make things
easier for these companies to come and soon land prices
really went up around Amman and Wadi Seir. The expansion
of Amman went to the west, because of the good roads,
toward the other Circassian towns. Most of the Circassian
land was either sold or leased. Prices were as high as
150,000 J.D. ($420,000) to 200,000 J.D. ($560, 000) per
dunham and getting higher. All this land speculation
stopped in 1976 when the government threatened to pass
high taxes to stop the land speculation. Many of the
Circassians, much more than before, are getting involved
in trade now from the money they got from the lands.
Many have taken jobs with the foreign firms which moved
in, representing the firms with the Jordanian government.
Politics is not so popular anymore and is viewed as a
traditional thing now. In the last elections, in 1976,
Rifat Mirza, brother of Wasfi Mirza, was going to run
for a seat but no one in the Circassian community was
interested and he could get no support. "^-55
L




The military is another area in which Circassian
participation has declined in favor of appointive political
positions and trade. While no figures are available and
Circassian enlistment in the elite Commando unit and Air
Force continue to he high, Circassian enlistment in troop
units has declined.
As stated in the introduction to this thesis, the
framework for the analysis of the position or status of
the Circassians in Jordan is that originally put forth by
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture .
For obvious reasons this analysis will not be either as
detailed or as systematic as that which they set forth due
to the lack of on-site research. However, as Dr. Ben-Dor
points out this should not be a prerequisite for using
the framework, simply as acknowledged deficiency. The
only study on Jordan which approached the survey techniques
propounded by Almond and Verba was the chapter on Jordan
from Daniel Lerner's book, The Passing of Traditional
1 57Society , " This study is now quite dated and was not
1 58
conducted in any depth. D and the work was concluded five
years previous to The Civic Culture .
1
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The Civic Culture attempts to explain the relationship
of a people to a government and vice versa using, as its
measurement, the progress toward a democracy or participatory
government, a country has made. In this standard it suffers
from a western orientation, hut acknowledges this ^ and
attempts to compensate for it by including five nations,
the United States, Britain, France, Italy and Mexico in the
, , 160
study.
The chief strength of the theory of the Civic Culture
lies not in its goal--to evaluate a country based on its
1 61progress toward democracy or "the civic culture", but
in its system of analysis of populations and population
subcultures. This system -utilizes several terms which must
be defined before proceeding further.
The basic term used in this method of analysis is
"political culture" defined as "attitudes toward the
political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards
162the role of self in the system. " In discussing these
attitudes three categories are utilized "cognitive
orientation," that is knowledge of and belief about the
political system", J "affective orientation or feelings
1 ^9













about the political system, its roles, personnel and
164 ...performance," and 'evaluational orientation, the judge-
ments and opinions about political objects that typically
involve the combination of value standards and criteria
with information and feelings." D
These categories of attitudes are measured against
four criteria, 1. the system as a general object or general
knowledge about the system, 2. input objects or, the
conversion of demands by the citizen into policy, 3- output
objects or the administration of policy and finally 4. the
self as an object or degree to which the individual feels
166he possesses the ability to influence the system.
Based upon these the measurement of these criteria the
political culture of a nation, or subculture within a
nation is divided into a mixture of one of three basic
types, "parochial, subject or participant." The three most
prevalent culture mixtures are the "parochial-subject
culture" in which, "a substantial portion of the population
has rejected the exclusive claims of diffuse tribal, village
or federal authority and has developed allegiance toward a












governmental structures." The main factor which differs
this type of culture from the two following is the lack of
opportunity for the individual to become involved in the
governmental decision process.
The "subject-participant" culture is the second major
political culture evident in the world today. It is defined
as a culture in which, "a substantial part of the population
has acquired specialized input orientations and an activist
set of self -orientations , while most of the remainder of the
population continue to be oriented toward an authoritarian
governmental structure and have a relatively passive set of
169
self -orientation. " ' The two primary features of this type
of culture are, "a characteristic pattern of structural
instability with an alternation of authoritarian and
170democratic governments," which produces a political
culture which, "accepts the norms of a participant culture,
but their sense of competence is not based on experience or
171
on a confident sense of legitimacy. " '
The third political culture cited is the, "parochial-
participant" culture which is, "evident in most emerging
172


















side to lean on, neither a bureaucracy resting upon loyal
subjects, nor an infrastructure arising from responsible
173
and competent citizens." v
A final point must be made about the utilization of this
theoretical framework in the analysis of the Circassian
minority in Jordan. The political culture of a given nation,
or any subculture within that culture, will have various
combinations and strains of the three major types of political
culture. In terms of the Circassian minority in Jordan a
single tribe or family may have a political outlook or
orientation far removed from the majority. The major thrust
of this section is to determine and analyze the major or
dominant political outlook. For example, in Daniel Lerner's
chapter on Jordan he identifies four distinct cultural
17^groups.
Many minority groups within a culture tend to identify
themselves in an ethnic rather than national context. The
phenomenon is perhaps most evident in the Middle East in the
case of the Palestinians, aided in no small part by the
efforts of their host countries to keep them isolated from
the citizenry of the country. Do the Circassians of Jordan
see themselves in a larger cultural context? Prior to an
analysis of the Jordanian Circassians as a political sub-
culture of Jordan, it is necessary to insure that they






and not a greater ethnic body. The primary measure of this
would be the interaction between Circassian communities in
Syria, which contain the largest Circassian population in
the Middle East. In all interviews conducted with Circassians
from both Jordan and Syria, the Participants stated that the
only interaction between the two communities was for the
purpose of Circassian men finding a Circassian woman to
marry, and with the advent of increased intermarriage with
the Arabs, this interaction has declined greatly. The most
frequently stated reason for this lack of interaction was
the persistent political instability between the two
countries. When questioned about political loyalty all
Jordanian Circassians, even those whom had left the country
to become American citizens, stated that the Syrian and
Jordanian Circassians had so little in common that there
17 =>
was little reason for interaction between the two communities. -*
Similarly a desire to return to the Caucasus can be
dispensed with as a factor not impinging upon the primary
outlook of the Circassians to the Jordanian government.
Opportunities to return to the Circassian homeland have been,
and continue to be available to Jordanian Circassians. But
other than for purposes of study, as previously mentioned,
few if any Circassians desire to return, at least until the
area has been "liberated" from the Russians, a fond hope





activity is taken. When asked about such an eventuality
most Circassians voice sentiments which are reminiscent of
the pioneer American, the carving out of a homeland in a
hostile and barren area and a feeling of participation in
the establishment of Jordan.
From these attitudes it is fairly safe to assume that
the Circassian minority in Jordan conceives of its central
loyalty as being to the larger, supre-national , ethnic
Circassian race.
Following the civic culture system (and again, as
previously stated, drawing from a limited sampling and
historical reference) , the analysis of the political
orientation of the Jordanian Circassian will proceed along
"176
the lines illustrated by the following diagram:
Dimensions of Political Orientation
1. 2. 3- ^.
System as Input Output Self as active




The cognitive orientation of the Jordanian Circassians
is perhaps the most easy to generalize since this rests
primarily on an educational, rather than emotional basis.
Thus, the "knowledge of and belief about the political
1 76




system" can be said to be a function of the Jordanian
educational system rather than information received from
other sources, unless that information runs contrary to the
information from the educational system. In this context,
most alternate information sources, Palestinian publications,
foreign news sources etc. which have been hostile to the
Jordanian political system have also been hostile to the
Circassians, picturing them as loyal supporters of that
system. This would leave only the home and family as a
source of information contrary to the educational system,
which, considering the rigid discipline reknown in Cir-
cassian households, is a remote possibility. The affective
orientation of the system as a whole, the "feelings about
the system" would appear to proceed from and be reenforced
by the cognitive orientation. While it is true that Cir-
cassians have been active in alternative political movements
,
this activity has been largely viewed as either aberation
179from the "norm" or as an attempt by a family to subvert
the political power of a family in power, such as the
support, in 1956 » by the Tash family of al-Nabulsi. In
this category, background and culture dictates loyalty to




179Mr. Bak, 25 May 1978.
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political system is most frequently evident in comparisons,
which Jordanian Circassians have made between the American
and Jordanian political systems. The "judgements and
opinions" which emerge usually revolve around the
necessity for Jordan, in a constant state of danger from
the exterior and a need to rapidly modernize in the
interior, to have a strong central government. This
sentiment is usually combined with a favorable opinion of
King Hussein. The key to King Hussein's success in Jordan
has been linked with the ability by Hussein to command deep
personal loyalty on the part of various sectors of his
country. This sense of personal loyalty is very much
evident in the Circassians. The combination which emerges
is the necessity of a strong central government due to
interior and exterior factors and the conviction that the
power of such a government will not be abused in the hands
of King Hussein. This feeling also extends to Crown Prince
Hassan, who has been very active in commercial activities
and has close contact with several leading Circassian
families. This general conception of personal loyalty is
strengthened by the recent marriage of the son of Wasfi
Mirza to King Hussein's daughter, Alyia.
The political orientations of the Jordanian Circassians
toward the input objects of the Jordanian political system,
the conversion of Circassian political needs into policy
would also seem to follow the above pattern. The Circassians
have, throughout the political history of Jordan, been
11^

well represented by the Circassian elite in the system.
While the representation within the Circassian community
has been controlled by an elite, is conceived of as a
representation of the whole community and not of that
elite. The cognitive orientation of the Circassian minority
has been fairly well channeled, in earlier periods of
Jordanian history toward the traditional elite of the tribe,
and in the latter years toward positions requiring
technological ability. The effective orientation toward
input objects has been one of a pride based upon success,
both political and economic. The evaluational orientation
of input objects would tend to follow the above orientations,
although may be effected by the judgement as to the relative
effectiveness of the Circassian elite to represent a par-
ticular family or tribe based upon intra-family or tribal
conflicts. Information on these conflicts is almost
impossible to get due to a desire on the part of Circassians
to de-emphasize such conflicts to non-Circassians.
The political orientations of Circassians as to the
output objects or administration of programs and policies
revolves, around two major areas. The first is the strong
identification of Jordanian Circassians with the govern-
mental instruments which administrate governmental decisions.
The high percentage of Circassians in the military and
other governmental branches, since the formation of the
Emirate has created this concept.
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The second major area dealing with governmental output
objects is the frustration, among the younger generation,
of attempting to make the radical transition necessary to
allow Jordan to realize many of its economic and social
goals. This frustration is normally not directed toward
governmental bureaus but rather at the traditional
elements of society opposed to change. The events of the
early 1970 's, the civil war and later the influx of foreign
firms from Beirut has done much to amealorate such dis-
content, due to the prompt and successful government action
in both cases.
Thus the cognitive orientation of the Circassians
toward the output objects of the government is one of
experience and tradition. This re-enforces the affective
orientation as the Circassian minority identifies with the
output objects, and finally the evaluational orientation,
based on the above is one of relative approval, although
marred by the inability of the output objects to overcome
certain traditional areas of resistance.
The crux of the civic culture is the concept of
self. The concept is of such importance as to necessitate
the full definition from the text. The concept of self
as active participant entails the following:
"How does he perceive of himself as a member of his
political system^ What knowledge does he have of his
rights, powers, obligations, and of strategies of access
to influence? How does he feel about his capabilities?
What norms of participation or of performance does he
acknowledge and employ in formulating political judgements,
or in arriving at opinions? "180
l80Almond and Verba, p. 16.
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This is the most difficult category in which to draw
generalizations since it deals with personal feelings which
most Circassians have been reluctant to discuss. However,
the history of the Circassians in Jordan allow certain con-
clusions to be made. Governmental service has been a
tradition in this history and this has formed, to some
extent the norms of participation. The strong opposition
to the regime by the Palestinians, which included opposition
to the Circassian minority in particular, has also re-enforced
this sense of duty and the large number of successful Cir-
cassians in the government, military and economics has
provided a role model for norms of performance, and
possibilities of success. While such role models have been
members of an elite to which entry is based upon family
status is undeniable, but in areas such as the military this
has been the exception rather than the rule.
Based upon the political orientation outlined above
the Circassian political subculture would be categorized
as being strongly participatory in nature with some
lingering traces of subject culture attitudes. The
Circassian minority in Jordan has escaped the fate of the
Circassians in Syria, that is alientation by both the
government and populace due to allegiance to an authori-
tarian government which was overthrown. Undoubtedly this
lesson was not lost on them and the reaction was one of
strong participation in the Jordanian government stemming
from both self interest and a cultural background which
117

reenforces this attitude. The Circassian minority can be
expected to continue in its support for the monarchy which
has reciprocated its support with political, economic
and military opportunities. Although the younger generation
of Circassians may become increasing discontented by the
progress which the government is able to make in certain
economic spheres, they are unlikely to become agents of
radical change, due in part to their cultural background
and in part to the large vested interest they have in the
system. The amazement which many authors on Jordan have
voiced over the political survival of King Hussein is due
in no small part to the ignorance of factors, such as the
Circassian minority, at work. Although the possibilities
for a violent overthrow in the area are always present
the possibility of an orderly transition of power, should
King Hussein die , are far more likely. This transition will
be made far more smooth by the support of the Circassian
minority, among many other sectors of the Jordanian populace,
have for Crown Prince Hassan.
The Circassian minority in Jordan will continue to
support the Hashemite monarchy and provide a conservative
sector of the populace deeply involved in the economic
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